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Abstract
When people migrate internally, do they tend to move to locations that reflect their political
preferences? To address this question, we first compile a unique panel dataset on the universe of
population movements in England and Wales across 346 local authority districts over the period
2002-2015, and estimate a gravity model of internal migration. We show that proximity in
partisan composition exerts an important positive effect on migration flows, which is of a similar
order of magnitude as wage differentials or ethnic proximity. We then use individual survey-
based data over the same time period to investigate some of the micro-foundations underlying
the “macromoves”. We find that political alignment to the district of residence contributes
to individuals’ sense of belonging and ‘fitting in’ – consistent with the existence of a political
homophily mechanism – and that a migrant’s political ideology can predict the partisanship of
the destination district.
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1 Introduction
The United Kingdom (UK) is one of the most highly mobile societies in Europe, with over 1 million
people moving across regions within England and Wales every year (Swinney and Williams, 2016).
The UK is also a politically polarized society. Since the Brexit referendum was announced, scholars
and political commentators have often warned about the increasing “tribalization” of British politics
(Duffy et al., 2019). Although the 2016 EU referendum vote cut across party and ideological
lines, partisan identities have never disappeared (Schumacher, 2019). In fact, policymakers and
commentators have often noted that a “divided” Britain is not a new phenomenon.1 For one, a
degree of partisan concentration has always existed across the UK national landscape (Johnston
et al., 2006); and bitter political divisions and negative views of opponents have long been present,
such as during the miners’ strike of 1984-85, the poll tax riots in the 1990s, and the 2003 protest
against the war in Iraq. In a recent work, Boxell et al. (2020) construct a measure of polarization
that permits comparison across countries; they show that, since 1980, “affective polarization” –
the extent to which citizens feel more negatively towards other political parties than towards their
own – has been consistently higher in Britain than in the United States (US), particularly when
restricting attention to the two largest parties. This phenomenon of animosity and the tendency
to dislike and distrust those from the other party has thus endured in the last four decades.2
When people migrate internally, do they tend to move to locations that reflect their political
preferences? In other words, do internal migrants in the UK consider the pre-existing distributions
of political opinion across destination communities? This paper contributes to the extant literature
on internal migration and on the consequences of political polarization by undertaking a compre-
hensive analysis of the effect of political preferences on migration patterns. To do so, we compile a
unique panel dataset on the universe of internal migration in England and Wales over the period
2002-2015 – consisting of detailed information on yearly bilateral migration flows across 346 local
authority districts (LADs) – and combine evidence from this district-level dataset with evidence
stemming from individual survey-based data over the same time period. The latter allows us to
investigate how individuals’ political preferences affect their destination choices, and to delve into
the mechanism underpinning this relation.
To analyse the determinants of bilateral migration flows, we employ a gravity model of inter-
nal migration augmented with a measure of political similarity between districts. Following the
latest developments in the gravity literature, we use Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML)
estimation to address issues related to heteroscedasticity and zeros (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) and
time-varying destination and origin fixed effects to account for changes in the ‘multilateral resis-
tance’ constraints implied by the relevant theory (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra,
1Available here: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jan/13/divided-britain-not-new-why-
do-todays-schisms-seem-intractable
2Interestingly, they also show that, in the UK, polarization actually slightly declined in recent decades.
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2004). These fixed effects also control for all district-specific time-varying factors affecting both
emigration and immigration decisions, and thus, under this setting, only the role of bilateral factors
can be identified. To capture political similarity, we exploit information on election outcomes at
the local level. Compared to the parliamentary elections, the existence of a rotation schedule for
the election of councillors means that these elections can take place in any given year (see, e.g.,
Fetzer, 2019). Hence, by using outcomes of local elections – in lieu of national elections – we can
leverage bilateral annual variations in political similarity between origins and destinations,3 and
combine this information with annual dyadic data on migration flows.
We consider two alternative measures of political similarity. Following studies on partisanship
and geographic polarization in the US, our first measure is a binary indicator capturing whether
the local council in the origin and the destination district is controlled by the same party (either
the Labour or the Conservative party). This allows us to investigate whether (and to what extent)
districts with the same political preferences have higher bilateral migration flows. The second
measure is a continuous variable capturing pair-specific ideological spread (political distance) based
on the two parties’ seat shares in the local council. Although this continuous variable is highly
correlated with the dichotomous classification of district pairs, it allows us to flexibly account for
the role of political preferences in shaping destination choices even when people decide to move
across politically mismatched districts.4
Our district-level analysis reveals that shared political ideologies have a strong positive impact
on migration flows between two districts. For instance, according to the estimate of our continuous
measure, a one-standard-deviation increase in political distance between the two districts will lead
to a decrease in migration flows by about 4%. Put differently, dyads/years with the highest value
of political distance have, all else equal, about 22% lower migration flows than dyads/years with
the lowest value of political distance. Reverse causality is not a major problem in our analysis since
migration flows at the bilateral level are just too modest to have a sizeable effect on local election
outcomes. A more serious concern, though, is the possibility of omitted variable bias arising
from unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. To lend further credibility to our results, we employ
three different approaches. First, we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to augmenting the
gravity model with a wide set of controls capturing pair-specific differences in socio-economic and
demographic characteristics. Second, we include origin-destination pair fixed effects in addition to
the theoretically-motivated origin-year and destination-year fixed effects. This absorbs most of the
linkages between the political similarity measure and the remainder error term in order to control
3The number of votes cast for each party across local council elections can be used as a “massive opinion poll”. In
addition to their scale, the advantage over conventional polling is the detailed information on actual voting behaviour
rather than reported intentions. See https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-impact/what-do-the-2016-
local-elections-tell-us-about-what-might-happen-in-2020/#.YAvi-S1Q1pQ
4To provide further evidence, we also exploit information on the “political direction” of migration flows and
investigate whether, for example, Conservative-district residents select the Labour-district destination with the highest
relative support for the Conservative party.
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for potential endogeneity of the former (Yotov et al., 2016), and identification in this case comes
only from changes in political similarity within a specific migration corridor. Third, we adopt
an instrumental variable strategy, where political distance is instrumented using a ‘shift-share’
instrument a la Altonji and Card (1991). In this way, we rely on variation stemming from the
interaction of time-varying ‘national’ political distance and cross-dyad differences in initial political
distance. We believe that, by paying greater attention to causality and by reporting an array of
different specifications and robustness tests, our paper makes a step forward in understanding the
determinants of internal migration flows, in particular its political dimension.
Our district-level analysis is based on two premises. The first is that the main channel under-
pinning our result is the existence of a political homophily mechanism; i.e., the tendency to favour
the company and presence of others who share similar political values (Bishop, 2009; Tam Cho
et al., 2013). This is the foundation of Schelling’s (1971, 1978) original model of racially segregated
neighbourhoods, in which members of two groups relocate to achieve some degree of proximity
to other residents of similar type.5 To corroborate this mechanism and investigate some of the
micro-foundations underlying the “macromoves”, we employ a large individual-level panel dataset,
obtained by combining the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) with Understanding Society
(UKHLS). Our analysis shows that a desire for political homophily is indeed at play and living in
areas with similar ideological views contributes to individuals’ sense of ‘fitting in’ and ‘feeling at
home’ and increases the overall satisfaction they have with the location where they live. For exam-
ple, politically aligned individuals are 2 percentage points less likely to exhibit preference to move
and 2-4 percentage points more likely to express positive perceptions and attitudes towards their
neighbourhood. If anything, this suggests that individuals are attracted to “politically compatible”
areas.
A second premise is that this desire for political homophily affects migration flows only once a
decision to migrate (e.g., for economic reasons) has been taken. In other words, political alignment
per se is not a reason to leave. This is consistent with both the literature on geographic sorting and
the extant economic literature on internal migration, which points towards income prospects and
other economic considerations as the main drivers (e.g., Greenwood, 1997; Kennan and Walker,
2011). Using our individual-level dataset, we show that this is indeed the case. Specifically, we
find that, while political alignment does not have a direct and immediate impact on the decision
to change district of residence, a migrant’s political ideology can predict the partisanship of the
destination district.
5One important implication of this model is that even when a relatively small fraction of people sort, they
could cause the neighbourhood to “tip” from completely white to completely non-white over time. In our context,
this implies that once a cycle of “homophily movements” has started, migration could lead to completely politically
segregated communities. Yet, although theoretically fascinating, there is mixed evidence of the existence of a “tipping
point” in racial segregation in the US (Card et al., 2008; Easterly, 2009). A more plausible implication for our study
is that, once people choose destinations on a political basis, the cumulative effect in the long run can significantly
increase population differences across space.
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Our research contributes to extant studies on the factors shaping the destination choices of
internal migrants. A wealth of research has demonstrated that economic considerations play an
important role in the decision to relocate and that movers select destinations on the basis of better
employment opportunities and higher wages (see, e.g., Jackman and Savouri, 1992; Greenwood,
1997; Kennan and Walker, 2011; Langella and Manning, 2019b).6 At the same time, relocation
patterns exhibit geographic sorting by a number of neighbourhood and municipality characteristics
that affect overall satisfaction (see, e.g., Bracco et al., 2018; Langella and Manning, 2019a). We
also contribute to recent studies on whether internal migrants sort geographically based on their
desire to live with neighbours with similar status and values (Bishop, 2009; Florida and Mellander,
2009; Tam Cho et al., 2013; Carlson and Gimpel, 2019). In fact, the increasing presence of homo-
geneous pockets of political support in the US has stimulated a wealth of research in its own right
on whether liberal and conservative Americans have become spatially isolated from one another,
the so-called “Big Sort hypothesis” (Sussell, 2013; Tam Cho et al., 2013; Johnston et al., 2016;
Rohla et al., 2018; Carlson and Gimpel, 2019). People care about the characteristics of the local
community where their social interactions take place, and partisans differ starkly in their prefer-
ences for community type. Accordingly, this line of research shows that the geographic clusters
of like-minded individuals are also shaped by political preferences (Sussell, 2013; Tam Cho et al.,
2013). Extant research disproportionally focuses on the US, the archetypal case of a highly po-
larized society where the ideological divide is at a historic high and has been widening since the
late 1970s (White and Lindstrom, 2005; Autor et al., 2020). We contend that the very high rate of
within-country migration, coupled with a two-party strong predominance of the political process
and the historical high levels of ‘affective’ polarization (Boxell et al., 2020), make the UK a suitable
test-bed to examine whether partisanship affects internal migration outside the exemplary US case.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that investigate partisan sorting across
the entire population of a country and over such an extended period of time.
En route, we contribute to the literature on geographic mobility in the UK and the processes that
cause people to move across regional boundaries (Jackman and Savouri, 1992; Andrews et al., 2011;
Thomas et al., 2015; Langella and Manning, 2019b). In estimating the role of political proximity
in affecting internal migration flows, we use more granular data at the district level, rather than
at the government office region level (Jackman and Savouri, 1992), and exploit information on the
vast majority of households rather than a representative sample (Andrews et al., 2011; Thomas
et al., 2015). While not as comprehensive as the decennial population census (see Langella and
Manning, 2019b), this data offers an uninterrupted series of yearly observations for district movers
which is more suitable for the research question at hand. We ask to what extent each of the
local characteristics compare to political similarity in determining and predicting migration flows.
Consistent with past migration research, factors such as income, physical distance, and migrant
6Destination choices are also shaped by life-course events and housing and family structure transitions (White
and Lindstrom, 2005; Molloy et al., 2011; Bernard et al., 2014).
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networks all display a consistent relationship with destination choices. Yet, to reiterate our previous
point, whereas the political similarity variable exerts an important effect, it is also of a similar order
of magnitude as the effect of the wage differentials variable.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the data and empirical strategy used for the district-
level analysis, and reports the effects of political proximity on “macromoves”; i.e., migration be-
tween districts. Section 3 discusses the data and methods used for the individual-level analysis,
and presents evidence supporting the political homophily mechanism and the positive relationship
between a migrant’s self-reported ideology and the destination’s partisanship. Section 4 concludes.
2 District-Level Analysis
2.1 Data and variables
We obtain data on annual bilateral migration flows at the local authority district (LAD) level from
the ONS’s People, Population and Community theme.7 Our sample covers all possible origin and
destination districts in England and Wales (346 × 345) and spans a period of 14 years, 2002-2015.8
By construction, this results in a dataset consisting of 119,370 origin-to-destination corridors and
over 1.6 million corridor-year observations. The bilateral nature of the data, together with the large
number of possible corridors, imply that migration flows in a given year are quite low relative to
the population size of the two districts. In fact, about 48% of our observations correspond to zero
flows. These zeros may arise for reasons that are related to factors explored in our analysis, and
thus including them in our estimation can provide additional information on migration patterns.
In Figure 1, we present Sankey diagrams for the top 20 migration corridors, in terms of size of
flows, in years 2002, 2007 and 2012. A visual inspection of this figure highlights the importance
of geography in determining internal migration: the origin and destination districts tend to be
geographically close to one another, and very often, share contiguous borders. For example, we can
observe a large number of people moving from Manchester to Trafford and Stockport in 2007 and
2012, and several cases of intra-London flows in all three years.9
The key explanatory variable in our analysis is the political similarity between migrants’ origin
district i and destination district j (to be referred to as district pairs or dyads). We employ two
7Migration flows are primarily based on data that flag up when people change their address with their doctor.
The flows do not include ‘special populations’; for example, prisoners and members of the armed forces. For reasons
of disclosiveness, the data are reported in multiples of 10. As noted by the ONS, since most people change their
address with their doctor soon after moving, these data provide a good proxy indicator of internal migration. This
is broadly confirmed when we compare the ONS data with the decennial census data (when available). For instance,
the mean of bilateral migration flows for the year 2011 as recorded by the ONS (vs the 2011 population census) is
21.37 (vs 20.99), with a standard deviation of 97.36 (vs 103.35), a minimum value of 0 (vs 0) and a maximum value
of 4,530 (vs 4,752).
8The choice of the time period is determined by the availability of data for both the outcome variable (internal
migration flows) and the main explanatory variable (districts’ political preferences).
9Table B.2 in the Appendix provides a list of all districts with the corresponding government office region (GOR)
to which the belong.
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alternative measures of political similarity. The first one is a binary indicator taking value 1 if the
local council in the two districts at time t is controlled by the same party (either the Labour or the
Conservative party);10 and 0 otherwise; namely, Same party control. The second one is a continuous
measure of ideological spread between the two districts, which is calculated by the average distance
(absolute difference) in party shares for the two dominant parties, and formally defined as:
Distance in party sharesij,t =
1
2
(∣∣∣SLi,t − SLj,t∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣SCi,t − SCj,t∣∣∣)
where SL and SC represent the share of seats held by the Labour party and the Conservative party,
respectively, in the local council. The continuous measure varies in the interval [0, 1], with values
close to 0 indicating that the two districts are homogeneous with respect to their political ideologies.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of this variable for the universe of district pairs, but also for pairs
that share the same political preferences (Same party control = 1) and those that do not share
the same political preferences (Same party control = 0). An immediate and important observation
is that the continuous variable is highly correlated with the dichotomous classification of district
pairs: low values of Distance in party shares reflect copartisan districts (two Conservative or two
Labour districts), whereas high values of this variable mostly capture opposing-party districts.
However, the advantage of using the continuous measure in our analysis is that it can account for
the role of political preferences in shaping destination choices even when people decide to move
across politically mismatched districts; i.e., Labour-district residents selecting the Conservative-
district destination with the highest possible support for the Labour party (see Section 2.4.3 for
further evidence on this). On the other hand, the binary measure comes with the advantage that
it changes very slowly over time and thus it is less subject to potential endogeneity arising from
changing migration flows.
To construct our political similarity measures, we consider local council elections rather than
the parliamentary elections for two main reasons. First, data on local election outcomes can be
easily matched to the internal migration data which are only available at the district level;11 and
second, local elections have an appealing feature in that, rather than happening uniformly across
the UK every four years, they may take place in any given year across the country due to the
rotating fashion by which councilors are elected (Fetzer, 2019). Exploiting information about the
10The UK political landscape is characterised by the presence of a two-party system. Since 1945, the combined
Conservative and Labour share of the vote at the general elections has been around 70%, and after a small decline in
2007, it has increased to one of its highest levels in decades (Duffy et al., 2019). The dominance of the two parties is
also apparent in local governments, with the two leading parties having, on average, more than 70% of local council
seats. We follow recent studies on affective polarization in the UK which focus on the two largest parties given the
large number of survey respondents identifying with them (Boxell et al., 2020). We expect partisan sorting to be more
likely in a political system dominated by two parties, like in the US or the UK (Tam Cho et al., 2013). Note that
including additional parties would be particularly challenging in the context of local elections given the presence of
numerous successful local parties, with the additional difficulty of neatly classifying them along the classic ideological
spectrum. We return to this issue in Section 2.4.3.
11Aggregating parliamentary election outcomes to the district-level is not possible due to overlapping boundaries.
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share of seats is useful as it reflects the first-past-the-post electoral system used in England and
Wales to elect the councilor in each council electoral division (electoral ward), and thus accounts
for differences in political preferences across small geographic units within the same district. For
more details on local government services, elections and reforms, see Appendix A.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
2.2 Methodology
To examine the impact of political similarity on internal migration flows, we consider an augmented
gravity model of migration with multilateral resistance (Anderson, 2011; Beine et al., 2016, 2019).
According to this model, migration is driven by the attractive force between source and destination
locations and the impeded costs of moving from one region to another, as well as multilateral factors
determining the overall inward and outward migration rates. In particular, we consider migration
flows to be a function of relative wages, the “mass” of the two economies, and the physical distance
between them, and add time-varying directional (origin and destination) fixed effects to account
for all factors affecting emigration decisions and the choice of a particular destination over other
alternatives. The main difference in our approach is the focus on within-country movements and
the expectation that (in addition to the above factors) the political similarity between the two
regions will also play a significant role for migration decisions.
Following the norm in the recent literature, we employ the PPML estimator, proposed by Silva
and Tenreyro (2006), and estimate the gravity model in levels rather than logs. The use of PPML
controls for heteroscedasticity which often plagues migration data, and takes into account the
information contained in the zero migration flows (Yotov et al., 2016). The latter allows us to rule
out potential selection bias arising from district pairs with zero flows having a different population
distribution compared to those with positive flows (Beine and Parsons, 2015). Furthermore, when
the gravity equation is estimated with PPML, the directional fixed effects estimates have been shown
to be completely consistent with the outward and inward multilateral resistance terms (Fally, 2015).
More formally, our PPML model specification takes the following form:
Migration flowsij,t = exp
(
αPSij,t + βXij,t + γit + γjt
)
+ vij,t (1)
where Migration flowsij,t represents the directional flows of migrants between two districts, mea-
sured by the number of migrants flowing from a district of origin i to a destination district j at
time t; PSij,t is one of the two political similarly measures (Same party control or Distance in
party shares), as defined in Section 2.1; Xij,t is a vector containing time-varying and non-time-
varying bilateral variables, specific to a migration corridor; γit and γjt represent origin-year and
destination-year fixed effects, respectively; and, vij,t is an error term clustered at the dyad level.
As noted above, the inclusion of origin-year and destination-year fixed effects in our specification
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fully accounts for the multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra,
2002; Olivero and Yotov, 2012).12 Specifically, origin-year fixed effects capture all the factors
that determine the overall emigration rate from a district i, and the identification comes from
the differential emigration rates to specific destination districts; whereas destination-year fixed
effects capture all the factors that determine the overall immigration rate for a district j and the
identification comes from the differential immigration rates from all possible source districts. At
the same time, these fixed effects control for all district-specific time-varying sources of omitted
variable bias affecting both emigration and immigration decisions. As such, our model specification
implies that only the role of bilateral factors, specific to a migration corridor, can be identified.
The variables included in vector Xij,t are commonly used in the literature to reflect the eco-
nomic, demographic, geographic and ethno-linguistic factors influencing migration flows between
two districts.13 Specifically, to capture the argument that immigrant workers respond to differences
in labour incomes between regions – as implied by the labour market model of migration (see, e.g.,
Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Card, 2001) – we control for the ratio of destination-to-origin district
average wages (Wagej/Wagei). To reflect differential economic opportunities, we control for the
ratio of destination-to-origin district unemployment rates (Unemploymentj/Unemploymenti). To
account for the role that gravitational “mass” plays for migration flows, we control for the product
of the log of the populations of the two districts (Populationi × Populationj). As argued by Lewer
and Van den Berg (2008), the more people there are in a source region, the more people are likely to
migrate, and the larger the population in the destination region, the larger is the labour market for
immigrants. We also add to the specification the log of the physical distance between two districts
(Geographic distance) and a dummy variable for pairs of districts that share a contiguous border
(Contiguity) to proxy for geographical impediments to migration. Finally, vector Xij,t includes the
absolute difference in the ethnic fractionalisation index between origin and destination (Distance
in ethnic frac.),14 as a measure of cultural differences between the two districts.15 Table B.1 in the
Appendix provides summary statistics and a full description of all variables used in the analysis.
Not accounting for migration persistence may potentially affect the estimates of the time-varying
gravity estimates. To address this issue, we augment Eq. (1) with the lagged value of the depen-
12In many studies, the multilateral resistance terms are approximated by the co-called “remoteness indices” con-
structed as functions of bilateral distance, and Gross Domestic Products (GDPs). Head and Mayer (2014) criticize
such approaches as they bear little resemblance to the theoretical counterpart of the multilateral resistance terms.
13Note that, in the presence of multilateral resistance terms, the right-hand-side of Eq. (1) can only include corridor-
specific variables, and non-linear combinations of monadic (district-specific) variables at origin and destination, such
as ratios, products and distances (Head and Mayer, 2014).
14As in Langella and Manning (2019a), we rely on data from the 2001 and 2011 censuses, and impute values for the
inter-censual and post-censual years using linear interpolation for each district. As ethnic diversity is a slow-moving
variable, we do not expect interpolation to be an issue.






gn is the share of ethnic group g living in
district n, computed for non-white groups (Langella and Manning, 2019a). The fractionalisation index is one of many
possible ways to measure ethnic diversity. Using alternative measures of ethnic mix to proxy for cultural differences,
such as the share of the white population, does not change our results.
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dent variable (LDV). The inclusion of lagged migration flows as a regressor in the gravity model
also controls for the impact of migrant networks; i.e., current migration flows being correlated with
earlier flows because the cost of adapting to a new society is mitigated by the presence of family
members and friends who are familiar with both the source and destination region characteristics
(Lewer and Van den Berg, 2008; Beine et al., 2019). In addition, estimating the gravity equation
using a dynamic panel data setting allows for a flexible and comprehensive treatment of the multi-
lateral resistance terms. As illustrated by Olivero and Yotov (2012), the dynamic theory-founded
econometric specification (with a LDV and time-varying directional fixed effects) is superior to
alternative fixed effects specifications.
Extant research in electoral geography shows how socio-economic and demographic backgrounds
in the UK help explain local political preferences (Johnston et al., 2006). Whereas we control for
a number of these local-level demographic covariates, a long tradition of research in social science
also demonstrates that political identities are shaped by individual, historical, social and cultural
factors, such as the level of faith at different points in the life of an individual – as well as by
complex interactions between individuals and their environment (see, e.g., Druckman and Lupia,
2000; Green, 2010).16 As such, to the extent that demographic patterns do correlate with political
preferences, political similarity between districts would only be partially accounted for by our
control variables.
2.3 Endogeneity issues
Endogeneity concerns may arise with the estimation of Eq. (1). If political similarity between two
districts is influenced by unobserved bilateral factors that are also relevant for migration flows,
omitted variable bias would prevent the identification of a plausibly causal effect. Similarly, if
local election outcomes are partly determined by internal migration flows, reverse causality may
confound the relationship between the two variables.
Omitted variable bias. To assess the possibility of omitted variable bias, we test the sensi-
tivity of the political similarity effects to augmenting Eq. (1) with a large array of socio-economic
and demographic controls, including pair-specific differences in age structure, education levels,
industrial composition, religious composition, and genetic background.
As recommended in the gravity model literature, a more flexible and comprehensive way to
control for such bias is to include pair fixed effects, in addition to the theoretically-motivated
origin-year and destination-year fixed effects. First, the pair fixed effects capture all (observed and
unobserved) pull and push factors, as well as and the part of migration costs, that are pair-specific
and time-invariant. Second, the inclusion of pair fixed effects can control for potential endogeneity
of the political similarity variable by absorbing most of the linkages between this variable and
16For example, social scientists have examined the psychological foundations of partisan loyalties in the general
public. Accordingly, deep-seated personality traits – i.e., the stable tendencies to think, feel, and behave in particular
ways – shape political preferences and ideological identities (see, e.g., Jost et al., 2003; Johnston et al., 2017).
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the remainder error term vij,t (Yotov et al., 2016). As a result, within this setting, identification
comes from changes in political similarity (or the magnitude of political distance) within a specific
migration corridor, as captured by changes in the local election outcomes of the two districts. The
downside of this approach is that it reduces the variation used for identification enormously (leading
to more conservative estimates), and absorbs all time-invariant determinants of migration that are
used standardly in gravity regressions, such as geographic distance and contiguity.17 Furthermore,
using PPML reduces the sample size, as it drops all corridors with zero migration flows in all
sampled years (dyads with no variation in the dependent variable are treated as non-informative).
To further investigate the importance of omitted factors, we follow the methods developed
by Altonji et al. (2005) and look at the stability of the political similarity estimates as follow-on
information is added.18 In particular, we compare different combinations of ‘uncontrolled’ and
‘controlled’ regressions and calculate the corresponding selection ratios, which allow us to assess
how much larger the selection bias based on unobserved factors would have to be compared to
observed factors to fully explain our results.
Reverse causality. An important reason why reverse causality is less acute in our context is
that we rely on bilateral migration flows. As stressed by Beine et al. (2019), the bilateral nature of
this type of analysis makes concerns about reverse causality much less serious than in a unilateral
analysis, since migration flows at the bilateral level are too modest to influence the outcome of local
elections (even if we assume that all immigrants from a specific origin vote for the same party).
Indeed, as shown in Figure B.1, the average value of migration flows from district i to district j is
very small relative to the population size of district j (about 0.02%) or the total size of migration
flows to district j (about 0.30%), and remains very small even when we exclude observations that
correspond to zero flows (see Panels (a) and (b), respectively).
Nevertheless, to tackle the issue of reverse causality – and also to ensure that omitted variable
bias in not a major problem in our analysis – we take two complementary approaches. First, we
replace our political similarity variables with their one-year and two-year lags. This allows us to
mitigate the possibility that our results are driven by a contemporaneous effect of migration flows
on election outcomes. Second, we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) strategy,19 where Distance
in party shares is instrumented using a ‘shift-share’ instrument (Altonji and Card, 1991).20 The
17It has also been argued that, even though PPML models with a single fixed effect and a two-way setting are
asymptotically unbiased, a three-way fixed effect PPML model does not necessary inherit the same asymptotic
properties and may suffer from an incidental parameter problem (Weidner and Zylkin, 2020).
18Oster (2019) has recently extended the Altonji et al. (2005) method to enable the estimation of an unbiased
treatment effect in the presence of unobserved confounders. However, the assumptions necessary to apply the Oster
(2019)’s approach are not satisfied in the context of a PPML model.
19As stressed by Beine et al. (2016), in the framework of a gravity model that controls for multilateral resistance,
instrumentation is not necessary as long as the endogeneity problem is not due to reverse causality or as long as the
multilateral resistance terms (and pair fixed effects) capture a big part of the omitted factors. Both conditions are
largely satisfied in our context.
20As noted in Section 2.1, the binary measure ‘Same party control’ changes slowly over time and thus it is less
sensitive to marginal changes in the electorate’s composition and political preferences.
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intuition behind this approach is that, for historical reasons, two areas differ in terms of their
political support for the two leading parties, and these historical differences can determine the
degree to which a district pair is influenced by ‘national’ changes in ideological spread. More
precisely, our instrument is constructed as follows:
Shift-share instrumentij,t =
Distance in party sharesij,2002 × (1 + g
ij
t ) if year = 2003
Shift-share instrumentij,t−1 × (1 + g
ij
t ) if year > 2003
where Distance in party sharesij,2002 is the 2002 value of political distance between two districts,
and gijt is the growth rate of yearly average values of political distance across all pairs of districts.
In other words, variation in the instrument comes from the interaction between initial pair-specific
political distance (the ‘share’ term) and the changing patterns of political distance in England
and Wales as a whole (the ‘shift’ term). Since the national level of ideological spread reflects
the combined political preferences of all district pairs in the two countries, no pair alone is large
enough to have a sizeable impact on the national trend.21 As such, identification in this setting is
motivated by exogenous national ‘shocks’ (changes in national ideological spread over time), even
when exposure shares are assumed to be endogenous (Borusyak et al., 2020).22
The fixed-effect PPML gravity model may lead to inconsistent estimates when estimated with
IV techniques (Weidner and Zylkin, 2020), and thus we apply our instrument in the original OLS
specification, where the dependent variable is the log of bilateral migration flows.23 However, to
account for the non-linear nature of our modeling procedure, we also employ a control function
correction approach (Wooldridge, 2010), whereby the estimated OLS residuals from the first stage
are introduced as an additional control variable in the PPML specification of Eq. (1).
2.4 Empirical findings
2.4.1 Main results
Table 1 shows the results obtained from estimating Eq. (1). We start from a specification that in-
cludes the standard determinants of migration flows and multilateral resistance terms (column (1)),
21Excluding the dyads that involve either i or j when calculating the yearly (national) average for each observational
dyad ij has negligible effect on the value of the corresponding growth rates. This is not surprising given the large
number of origin-to-destination corridors in our sample (119,370); i.e., only 1% of the dyads are dropped each time.
22There is an ongoing debate about the identification assumptions behind the shift-share instruments, which largely
depend on the particular application and context (see Jaeger et al., 2018; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020; Borusyak
et al., 2020). Shares and shifts may simultaneously provide valid identifying variation, but in practice it is unlikely
for both sources of variation to be a priori plausible in the same setting (Borusyak et al., 2020). As noted above,
identification in our setting is motivated by exogenous shifts, but we also add pair fixed effects to control for the
potential endogeneity of shares. The inclusion of pair fixed effects means that we do not require initial political
distances to be exogenous to the level of bilateral migration flows, only to changes in bilateral migration flows.
23Following the norm in the literature, we add a value of one before taking the logarithm to avoid taking the
logarithm of zero.
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and we then add the two alternative political similarity measures (columns (2) and (4)). Overall,
our results are consistent with the existing analyses in the gravity model literature. Specifically,
in line with Lewer and Van den Berg (2008), we can see that the number of migrants moving
from the origin to the destination district is a positive function of the attractive “mass” of the
two economies and the ratio of destination-to-origin district wages, and a negative function of the
destination-to-origin unemployment rates. As emphasized in several migration studies (see, e.g.,
Beine and Parsons, 2015; Beine et al., 2016, 2019), we can also see that geographic distance – used
as a proxy for migration costs – is a major deterrent to internal migration, and that migrating
to a neighbouring district is fundamentally different than to a non-neighbouring district (even if
the actual distance travelled is the same). Finally, the results confirm that cultural norms play
an important role in determining migration choices: people are more likely to migrate to districts
whose ethnic mix is close to that of the origin district.
Turning now to the main variables of interest, we find strong evidence that bilateral migration
flows increase when the destination and origin districts share the same political preferences: the
variables Same party control (column (2)) and Distance in party shares (column (4)) enter the
gravity equation with the appropriate sign (positive and negative, respectively) and are statistically
significant at the 1% level. Substantively, the estimate of Same party control suggests that migration
flows between two Labour or two Conservative districts are 5% higher than those between other
pairs of districts. On the other hand, the estimate of Distance in party shares suggests that a
one-standard-deviation increase in political distance (around 19 percentage points) will lead to a
decrease in migration flows by about 4%. Put differently, dyads/year with the highest value of
political distance have, all else equal, about 22% lower migration flows than dyads/years with the
lowest value of political distance. Columns (3) and (5) of Table 1 investigate the robustness of
these (baseline) results to augmenting Eq. (1) with lagged migration flows. As expected, the
estimate of the LDV is positive and highly statistically significant, suggesting that popular migrant
destinations for the citizens of a specific source district continue to attract a lot of emigrants.
However, accounting for such network effects appears to have little effect on the estimates of the
other regressors, including those of the political similarity measures.
To explore more thoroughly the relative importance of bilateral factors in predicting migration
flows, we employ a Random Forest (RF) approach which allows us to calculate the mean decrease
in prediction accuracy when a given variable is excluded from the model (James et al., 2013).24
24RF is a supervised machine learning algorithm which uses decision tree-based classification to evaluate a massive
number of decision trees (known as the forest) generated using optimal splits in the data. It takes the predictions
from the forest and then selects the best by means of a voting mechanism. We begin by splitting our data into train
and test samples, we then iterate this process in order to optimise the algorithm by obtaining hyper-parameters for
the number of trees to grow and the number of variables to be considered at each node, and we finally force our
training data through the forest and obtain a prediction on the size of each migration flow. To avoid having too many
categories to predict, we bin the flow data into multiples of 50. The data are stratified by dyad and then randomly
split into test and training samples, 90% and 10%, respectively. The algorithm is optimised when we grow 500 trees
and consider two variables at each split in the tree.
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Figure 3 presents the RF variable importance measure for the specifications in columns (3) and
(5) of Table 1; Panels (a) and (b), respectively. According to the figure, the most important
variable in predicting migration flows between two districts at time t is lagged migration flows, and
this outstrips significantly the second ranked variable Geographic distance. Specifically, the migrant
network effect is three to four times as important as physical distance in predicting migration flows.
The continuous measure of political similarity, Distance in party shares, ranks sixth overall (Panel
(b)), and exerts about the same influence as relative wages and distance in ethnic mix, suggesting
that failure to account for this variable can lead to misspecification of the gravity equation.
[Table 1 and Figure 3 about here]
2.4.2 Endogeneity tests
As noted in Section 2.3, we take several approaches to get as close as possible to a causal interpre-
tation of our political similarity effects. In the following section, we present the findings of these
tests.
To alleviate concerns of omitted variable bias, we control for a wide set of explanatory vari-
ables that could distort our results. We start by considering time-invariant indicators capturing
geographic, historic and socio-demographic ties between the destination and origin districts. Specif-
ically, we add to the baseline specification dummy variables for pairs of districts that belong to
the same government office region (Same GOR),25 share the same genetic roots (Same genetic
group),26 and exhibit very similar socio-demographic characteristics (Same similarity group).27
Table 2 presents the results when these variables are introduced (individually and jointly) into Eq.
(1). The estimates of Same party control (columns (1)-(4)) and Distance in party shares (columns
(5)-(8)) are remarkably similar to those reported in Table 1, pointing to the same conclusions.
[Table 2 about here]
We next consider corridor-specific characteristics that vary over time, and thus can be correlated
with changes in our variables of interest. As before, these are first introduced separately and then
jointly. In particular, to further account for relative economic conditions affecting migration, we add
the ratio of destination-to-origin district nighttime light intensities (Night lightsj/Night lightsi).
28
25England and Wales are divided in 10 GORs.
26This is based on a fine-scale genetic map of the UK created by analysing DNA samples from more than 2,000
people whose four grandparents were all born in the same area (Leslie et al., 2015).
27Specifically, this dummy variable takes value one if the origin district is in the destination’s top 5 most similar
districts, as determined by similarity across 59 census statistics.
28Nighttime light intensity is commonly used by social scientists as a proxy for economic activity or economic
development in subnational regions. The measure is based on georeferenced images by the DMSP-OLS Nighttime
Lights Time Series Dataset (version 4) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and is available
for each district/year in our sample up until 2013. The values for the years 2014 and 2015 are imputed using linear
interpolation.
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To control for socio-economic and demographic factors that can potentially serve as predictors of
political similarity, we include the absolute difference in: the share of the population with no formal
qualifications (Distance in share of no qual.); the share of the population who are highly educated
(Distance in share of high qual.); the share of the population who are aged 18 to 64 (Distance in
share of aged 18-64 ); the share of the population who are aged over 64 (Distance in share of aged
over 64 ); the share of the population who are married or in a relationship (Distance in share of
married/couples); and, finally, the share of total gross value added generated by the manufacturing
sector (Distance in share of manuf. GVA). To capture the role of religious diversity in determining
migration choices, we also include the absolute difference in the share of the population who are
Muslims (Distance in share of Muslims). Columns (1)-(9) display the corresponding estimates on
two different panels. Panel (a) features estimates for Same party control and Panel (b) for Distance
in party shares. Finally, the last two columns of each panel (columns (10) and (11)) show the results
when we replace the LDV with the moving average of migration flows over the past 5 years (Lagged
5-year moving average) as an alternative proxy for pre-existing migrant networks; before and after
adding the extra controls. It should be stressed that, most of these added controls are highly
correlated with one another, and their joint inclusion into the gravity model can introduce serious
multicollinearity problems.29 However, throughout these specifications, the effect of the political
similarity measures is highly statistically significant and stable in size, which is quite reassuring as
regards to biases arising from the potential omission of unobserved bilateral characteristics.
[Table 3 about here]
A more comprehensive way to address the issue of omitted variable bias is to augment the model
specification with pair fixed effects (Yotov et al., 2016). This allows us to eliminate corridor-specific
factors that are time-invariant and inadequately controlled for by the aforementioned variables, and
also to account for the possibility that district pairs select into voting for the same party for reasons
related to internal migration. Table 4 presents the results when we add pair fixed effects to the
regression set-up of Table 1.30 Overall, we can see that employing this intensive set of fixed effects
(origin-year, destination-year and origin-destination) does not change the inferences drawn from
earlier findings: the estimates of the political similarity measures retain their sign and statistical
significance across all columns, even though they are smaller in magnitude. This is not surprising
since Table 4 exploits only within-pair variation and thus does not capture between-pair political
similarity effects; for instance, two Labour party strongholds with no (or very slow changes) in
their local council seat shares over the sampled period having higher migration flows.
29We also experimented with adding distances in the share of students and the share of home owners and, once
again, our results do not change. Note that these variables are very highly correlated with other controls in Table 3,
such as distances in the share of aged 18-64 or over 64 and the share of married/couples.
30It must be stressed that, when we focus on within-pair variation, the effect of Distance in ethnic frac. cannot be
correctly identified since the (missing) values of this variable for the inter-censual and post-censual years are imputed
using linear interpolation.
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[Table 4 about here]
As an additional step to evaluate the impact of omitted factors, we calculate selection ratios
based on the method proposed by Altonji et al. (2005). The goal of this exercise is to use selection
on observable characteristics to provide information on selection along unobservable factors. We
compare different combinations of ‘uncontrolled’ and ‘controlled’ regressions, assuming that the
observable characteristics are captured by the key determinants of migration flows (included in
vector Xij,t) and the LDV. We find that unobservable factors would have to be 4-53 times stronger
than observables to explain away the full relationship between political similarity and migration
flows, as reported in Table 4 (see Table B.3 in the Appendix). Such a strong role of unobserved
heterogeneity seems very unlikely.
As pointed out in Section 2.3, migration flows at the bilateral level are extremely small to
influence the outcome of local elections, at least in the short term. This mitigates the impact of
reverse causality, especially when we employ the binary measure that changes only when there is
a change in the party that controls the local council. However, to further alleviate these concerns,
we replace our political similarity measures with their one-year and two-year lags and re-estimate
the gravity model of Eq. (1) both with and without pair fixed effects. The lagged variables return
estimates in line with the previous findings – even when we exploit within-pair variation only –
suggesting that our results cannot be attributed to a contemporaneous reverse effect from outcome
to treatment (see Table B.4 in the Appendix).
Finally, we address the possibility of reverse causality and remaining omitted variable bias
by reporting IV estimates, where the continuous political distance measure is instrumented using
a ‘shift-share’ instrument. In this way, we rely on variation stemming from the interaction of
time-varying ‘national’ political distance and cross-dyad differences in initial political distance.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 5 show the results of a 2SLS-IV estimation, where the dependent variable
is the log of bilateral migration flows; whereas columns (5)-(8) show the results of a control function
estimation, where the first-stage estimated residuals are added to the PPML model of Eq. (1).31 In
all regressions, we restrict the sample to exclude the first two years, 2002 and 2003. The instrument
performs very well – as captured by high KP test statistic values – and, in all cases, the effect
of Distance in party shares turns out to be negative and statistically significant at conventional
levels, which provides further support for the arguments put forward in this paper.32 In terms
of magnitude, the estimates in columns (5)-(6) are relatively close to those reported in Table 1,
while the estimates in columns (7)-(8) are larger than those reported in Table 4; even though the
standard errors are larger as well. It should be noted that, in the pair fixed effects specifications,
31Since the PPML model uses an estimate of the error term from the first stage, as opposed to the true error
term, the asymptotic sampling variance of the second-stage estimates needs to take this extra source of variation into
account. To do that we undertake 200 replications of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors.
32The first stage estimations are provided in Table B.5 of the Appendix. Note that our results in columns (5)-(8)
of Table 5 persist when we add the quadratic estimated residual from the first stage and/or the residual interacted
with the political distance measure.
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the first stage takes the form of a difference-in-differences estimator with continuous treatment: we
compare political distance across district pairs with high or low initial values of political distance, in
years where national political distance is higher or lower. The resulting estimates are local average
treatment effects for the set of district pairs that increase their bilateral political distance in years
when national political distance rises (see Crawford et al., 2021).
[Table 5 about here]
2.4.3 Robustness tests and further insights
The key finding that emerges from our analysis is that shared political ideologies have a positive
impact on migration flows between two districts. To ensure robustness and gain further insights into
this finding, we perform a number of tests, which are reported in the Appendix. These are based
on our most preferred specification that includes the full set of fixed effects (which also produces
the most conservative estimates); even though the inferences do not change if we omit the pair
fixed effects.
Sensitivity to sampled regions and error clustering. In Table B.6, we check the sensi-
tivity of our results to excluding intra-region migration flows; that is, dropping the set of district
pairs that belong to the same GOR. Regardless of which GOR is excluded each time, the politi-
cal distance estimates remain negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the
corresponding effect appears to be stronger when we drop London, suggesting that political sim-
ilarity matters less when people move across London districts. In Table B.7, we assess how the
correction of standard errors affects our results. Specifically, for each estimated coefficient in Table
1, we examine three different types of standard errors: (i) heteroscedasticity-robust; (ii) clustered
at the dyad (district-pair) level, which is the method employed throughout our main analysis and
commonly used in similar settings (see, e.g., Yotov et al., 2016); and (iii) clustered at the origin,
destination and year levels (three-way clustering). The latter allows for correlation in the error term
within all six possible cluster dimensions (i, j, t, it, jt, ij), and, as such, it generally leads to more
conservative inferences of all estimated coefficients (Larch et al., 2019). Nevertheless, our results
are little affected by the method used: even though the standard errors are relatively larger when
a three-way clustering is used, the estimates of political distance retain their statistical significance
throughout (e.g., at the 1% level when the LDV is included).
Accounting for the role of local amenities. If one of the two leading parties tends to
favour policies directed towards improving local amenities like schools and roads (and its supporters
are more sensitive to this type of policies), one could potentially argue that a larger flow of internal
migrants between two districts governed by this party is driven by amenity provision rather than
the desire for political homophily. However, this is unlikely to be the case in England and Wales due
to the complex and heterogeneous local government system – with the majority of services being
provided by county councils rather than district councils in two-tier authorities (see Appendix A)
17
– making the choice of policies at the district level less subject to partisan influence. Furthermore,
as also discussed below, our results hold when we experiment with political similarity indices that
distinguish between the two leading parties. To further address this concern, we perform two
additional checks. First, we include the ratio of destination-to-origin district Index of Multiple
Deprivation (IMD) among the regressors.33 This index combines information on different domains
including education, barriers to housing and services, and living environment, and thus can serve as
a proxy for the quality of life at the district level (Langella and Manning, 2019a). As shown in Table
B.8, adding this variable has no effect on the estimates of political similarity. Second, we estimate
our regressions separately for district pairs with two-tier authorities (the responsibilities are split
between county and district councils in both the origin and the destination district) and those with
at least one single-tier authority. In both cases, the political similarity measures have the expected
sign and are highly statistically significant (see Table B.9), suggesting that our results hold even
when there is a weak relationship between amenity provision and local council partisanship.
Distance in Labour vs Conservative party shares. In Table B.10, we check the robustness
of our results to replacing our ‘composite’ political distance measure with either Distance in Con.
party share or Distance in Lab. party share, calculated by the absolute difference (between the two
districts) in the share of Conservative or Labour party seats in the local council, respectively. This
allows us to test whether our results can be attributed to similarities with respect to the support
for one of the two leading parties alone. Both variables exhibit a negative and highly statistically
significant effect on migration flows and do not change the inferences from earlier findings; even
though the estimates of the latter variable (Distance in Lab. party share) appear to have a relatively
larger magnitude. This is in line with recent survey-based evidence from the UK suggesting that
people who support more “liberal” or left-leaning sides of debates on party politics are more likely
to say that they struggle to be friends with those who take the opposing point of view,34 and, as a
result, have a stronger desire for political homophily.
The additional information provided by the continuous measure. As stressed in
Section 2.1, while the continuous political similarity measure largely reflects the dichotomous clas-
sification of district pairs into copartisan and opposing-party ones, it can also account for the role of
political preferences when people move across political mismatched districts. To illustrate this, we
construct the ratio of destination-to-origin district Conservative seat shares (Conservative ratio),
and interact this with the binary measures ConiLabj (capturing pairs of Conservative-origin and
Labour-destination districts) and 1 − ConiLabj (capturing all the other possible district pairs). In
33The IMD is published at five-year intervals so it has to be interpolated for intervening years. Since England and
Wales use different and non-comparable indices (Langella and Manning, 2019a), the results are shown for districts in
England only.
34According to the survey conducted by King’s College London and Ipsos MORI (https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-
institute/assets/fault-lines-in-the-uks-culture-wars.pdf), 35% of Labour supporters say it would be hard
to be friends with people who vote Conservative – five times the proportion of Conservative supporters (7%) who
say the same about those who vote Labour. Similarly, Labour supporters are more likely to describe Conservatives
as selfish (74% vs 30%), closed-minded (75% vs 59%) and hypocritical (67% vs 52%) than the reverse.
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this way, we can estimate the impact of the relative Conservative ratio on migration flows con-
ditional on the partisan composition of the two districts. The results, displayed in Table B.11,
indicate that the value of this ratio matters mostly when people move to a district with a different
political colour than the origin: the interaction term Conservative ratio × ConiLabj is positive and
has a large magnitude – suggesting that Conservative-district residents select the Labour-district
destination with the highest relative support for the Conservative party – whereas the interaction
term Conservative ratio × (1−ConiLabj) is close to zero and statistically smaller. Performing the
same analysis using the Labour ratio and focusing on the Labour-district residents moving to a
Conservative district leads to the same conclusions (see Table B.11).
3 Individual-Level Analysis
In this section, we shed light into the micro-foundations underlying the politically-induced migration
effects at the district-level. In particular, we investigate the main mechanism behind the political
similarity-migration nexus (the desire for political homophily), and examine the effect of individual
political preferences on the choice of the destination district.
To do so, we use individual-level data for the same time period as in the district-level analysis,
2002–2015, from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and its successor Understanding Soci-
ety (UKHLS). BHPS-UKHLS follow a representative sample of households over time, interviewing
all individuals aged 16 or above (once per wave-year), and include a wide range of questions on po-
litical and social attitudes. Interviews are carried out face-to-face in respondents’ homes by trained
interviewers or through a self-completed online survey, and respondents are coded based on resi-
dence at the district level. The wave-annual observations can be disaggregated into wave-quarterly
observations by exploiting information about the quarter of the year that the data is collected.
3.1 The desire for political homophily
3.1.1 Methods and results
To infer individuals’ desire for political homophily, we investigate whether individuals’ perceptions
and attitudes towards the location where they live are systematically affected by the extent of
political alignment with their own district. We start by exploring individuals’ answer to the ques-
tion: “If you could choose, would you stay here in your present home or would you prefer to move
somewhere else?”. This question appears in all waves, and thus it allows us to construct a large
individual-level unbalanced panel with about 215K observations (4.8 observations, on average, per
individual). We then consider three questions on neighbourhood satisfaction, which are asked less
frequently (in 5 waves in total); namely, whether one agrees with the statements: “I plan to remain
a resident of this neighbourhood for a number of years.”, “I feel like I belong to this neighbourhood.”,
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and “I think of myself as similar to the people who live in this neighbourhood.” – all resulting in a
sample of about 78K observations.
We define a subset of treated individuals as those who are ‘politically aligned’; that is, those
whose political preferences are aligned with the political preferences of their district. More formally,
we define Alignment as:
Alignmentn,d,w,s =
1 if Pn,d,w,s = Pd,w,s0 otherwise (2)
where Pn,d,w,s captures the political preferences of individual n, living in district d, and interviewed
in survey wave w and quarter s, as proxied by the response to the question “Which party do you
feel closest to?”, and Pd,w,s captures the political preferences of district d, as proxied by the party
that controls the local council at the same point in time.
We employ alternative specifications that include different combinations of fixed effects and
individual-level controls, with the most demanding one taking the following form:
Yn,d,w,s = ϑAlignmentn,d,w,s + δZn,d,w,s + λd,w,s + un,d,w,s (3)
where Yn,d,w,s is one of the four binary outcome variables; Zn,d,w,s is a vector of individual-level
control variables that includes (among others) age, age squared, gender, income decile, educational
background, employment status, marital status, having children, and household size (see Table C.1
in the Appendix for the full list); λd,w,s represents district × wave × time fixed effects; and un,d,w,s
is an error term, clustered at the individual and district levels (two-way clustering).
The inclusion of district × wave × time fixed effects implies that we only exploit between in-
dividual variation within a district. This effectively accounts for any district-specific time-varying
shocks affecting outcomes of respondents living in the same district in a common fashion, including
economic and political shocks affecting the wider local economy and migration behaviour. Adding
these fixed effects corresponds to estimating about 20,000 coefficients, and allows us to compare po-
litically aligned individuals with a very small number of individuals who are not politically aligned
but live in the same district and are interviewed in the same survey wave and quarter. Furthermore,
the inclusion of vector Zn,d,w,s in Eq. (3) controls for all important individual characteristics that
may potentially affect the attitudes towards one’s current location. However, to further mitigate
concerns of omitted variable bias, we check the robustness of our results when we focus on the sub-
sample of ‘core supporters’ for the Conservative or the Labour party; that is, the set of respondents
who report being closest to same party (Conservatives or Labour) across all survey waves.35 In
35To ensure that this classification is pre-determined relative to the other variables used in our analysis, we also
account for individuals’ political preferences during the five years preceding our sample period. In other words, a
respondent is coded as being a ‘core supporter’ if they express preference for the same party (Conservative or Labour)
every time they were interviewed during a 19-year period (1997-2015).
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this way, individual n’s political alignment at a given point in time is only determined by changes
in their district’s political preferences (the variable Pn,d,w,s in Eq. (2) is time-invariant), and thus
it is less prone to endogeneity arising from unobserved time-varying individual characteristics or
individual-specific time-shocks.
Table 6 shows the linear probability model (LPM) estimation results for the outcome variable
Preference to move, which takes value 1 if people report that they prefer to move (32% of obser-
vations), and 0 otherwise. Columns (1)-(2) present the estimates of Alignment when we employ
district fixed effects and GOR × wave × time fixed effects, before and after the inclusion of vector
Zn,d,w,s. This set of fixed effects absorbs any time invariant difference in migration attitudes across
districts, and controls for non-linear time trends specific to each of the 10 GORs in England and
Wales, thereby allowing us to exploit between-district and between-individual variation. On the
other hand, columns (3)-(4) present the estimates of Alignment when we employ instead district ×
wave × time fixed effects (as in Eq. (3)), and thus only exploit between individual variation within
a district. Throughout these specifications, there is a negative and highly statistically significant
effect of alignment on the outcome variable, with the estimates suggesting that politically aligned
individuals are about 2.5 percentage points less likely to report preference to move.36 In columns
(5)-(8), we replicate the regressions of columns (1)-(4), but we now restrict the sample of respon-
dents to those defined as ‘core supporters’. As noted above, to the extent that this sub-sample
includes the loyal base of supporters for the two leading parties (who do not change their political
preferences over time), the political alignment variable at a given point in time can be assumed
to be less responsive to (unobserved) changes in individual characteristics. Focusing on core sup-
porters has little effect on the results: the estimates of Alignment are once again negative and
highly statistically significant, although slightly smaller in magnitude. Substantively, the estimate
in column (8) implies that a Labour (Conservative) supporter who lives in a Labour (Conservative)
district is about 2 percentage points less likely to exhibit preference to move than a Conservative
(Labour) supporter who lives in the same district and is interviewed at the same time.
[Table 6 about here]
Table 7 shows the results for the three outcome variables on neighbourhood satisfaction based
on the same regression set-up as in Table 6. We assign value 1 to the responses “Agree” and
“Strongly agree” (and 0 to all the other responses) on whether people plan to stay in their current
neighbourhood (71% of observations), think of themselves as similar to others in this neighbourhood
(63% of observations), and feel that they belong to this neighbourhood (70% of observations), and
estimate LPMs like before. Despite the fact that the sample size is now three times smaller, the
evidence obtained is in line with the findings of Table 6: politically aligned individuals are 2-4
percentage points more likely to provide positive responses to the above statements, and this effect
36Table C.2 in the Appendix presents the full regression results of Table 6.
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holds when we focus on the subsample of ‘core supporters’. We consider this as evidence that a
desire for homophily is indeed at play; i.e., living in areas with ideological views similar to your own
can contribute to a sense of ‘fitting in’ and ‘feeling at home’ and increase the overall satisfaction
you have with your neighbourhood.
[Table 7 about here]
3.1.2 Robustness tests
In the Appendix, we present additional robustness and sensitivity checks. For brevity and compa-
rability, we report these checks for the variable Preference to move. However, performing the same
tests using the other three outcome variables leads to the same conclusions.
In Table C.3, we drop respondents who live in the same GOR (one GOR at a time), whereas
in Table C.4, we experiment with alternative clustering of standard errors (at the district and
survey wave levels, or at the district level alone). In all cases, we can observe a statistically robust
effect of political alignment on the outcome variable. In Table C.5, we replace the alignment
variable with its lagged value. The estimates of the lagged measure have the same sign as those
on the contemporaneous one, but appear to be economically and statistically less significant (as
expected), since they account for individuals who were not politically aligned in the previous wave.
In Table C.6, we explore the dynamics of the alignment effects around the period of treatment.
To do so, we augment the regression model with a placebo indicator that takes value 1 either in the
year before or in the year after an individual takes an alignment status. This exercise allows us to
evaluate the presence of omitted variable bias due to unobserved individual-specific, time-invariant
factors.37 The rationale here is that individuals who will become politically aligned in the future,
or used to be politically aligned in the past, exhibit the same underlying traits in these pre- and
post-treatment years as in the years in which they are politically aligned.38 Hence, statistically
significant estimates of these placebo years would indicate the presence of omitted variable bias and
would cast doubt on a causal interpretation of the reported effects. The placebo variable produces
estimates which fail to reach statistical significance and are statistically smaller than those on
Alignment (during the treatment period). Moreover, the alignment estimate is not affected by the
inclusion of the placebo dummy and remains statistically significant in all regressions, suggesting
that our key finding cannot be explained by similar patterns in non-treatment years.39
37An alternative approach to completely eliminate such unobserved factors is to exploit within-individual variation.
However, controlling for individual fixed effects is not appropriate in our case, as we only have a small number of
observations per individual and the political alignment measure exhibits little within-individual variation (it changes
over time for about 22% of individuals in our sample).
38This test is motivated by recent studies on the impact of political alignment on foreign aid allocation (see, e.g.,
Dreher et al., 2019; Anaxagorou et al., 2020).
39The ‘Placebo’ and ‘Placebo [core supporters]’ years correspond to 7% and 6.5% of the total number of observations,
respectively. It must be noted that we pool together the pre- and the post-treatment years to increase the number
of available placebo events. However, running the same regression set-up using separate indicators for pre- and
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In Table C.7, we augment Eq. (3) with the spatially lagged alignment, reflecting respondents’
alignment with respect to the political preferences of the neighbouring (contiguous) districts.40
This allows us to account for differences in the outcome variable caused by variation in the political
preferences of the surrounding area. At the same time, this controls for the possible sample selection
of individuals into districts. As pointed out by Langella and Manning (2019a), the fact that people
have to live somewhere means that the choice of district in each year can potentially be influenced
by the characteristics of this district – its political preferences in our case – relative to those of
other possible choices, and thus individuals are more likely to be found (in a given year) in districts
that offer them higher utility. Including the spatial lagged term into our model makes no difference
to the estimates of Alignment, and leaves our conclusions unchanged.
Finally, in Table C.8, we consider the heterogeneity of the observed effects with respect to four
individual characteristics: political ideology, age, income and education. To do so, we split the
sample of ‘core supporters’ into Conservative and Labour supporters, and re-estimate Eq. (3) with
Alignment replaced by its interaction terms with binary variables capturing the two sub-samples.
In the same way, we construct models that allow us to compare the alignment effects between low-
income and high-income people (as defined by the median value of the income variable), between
young-age and old-age people (as defined by the median value of the age variable), and between
people with a degree (or higher qualification) and those without a degree. In all four cases, we fail
to reject the null hypothesis that the effect of alignment is statistically different between the two
groups, suggesting that the desire for political homophily is not a unique phenomenon of individuals
with specific characteristics.
3.2 The effect of political preferences on the destination choice
The results above demonstrate that people are attracted to “politically compatible” areas. This,
however, does not mean that political preferences are the reason, or one of the main reasons, for a
subsequent relocation.41 Indeed, while political alignment can satisfy your need to belonging and
increase the satisfaction you have with your area, it is rather unlikely to have a large and immediate
impact on your decision to change district of residence, since the latter is mostly motivated by
employment and income opportunities (Thomas et al., 2015). To explore this issue, we follow
Langella and Manning (2019a) and test whether the variables considered in Section 3.1 can serve as
post-treatment years does not change our results: the estimates of both placebo dummies fail to reach statistical
significance and the estimate of alignment remains the same.
40Specifically, the variable ‘Spatially Lagged Alignment’ is a binary indicator taking value 1 if individual n’s political
preferences are aligned with the political preferences of the majority of the contiguous districts. For example, if 70%
of the contiguous districts are classified as ‘Labour’ (based on the party that holds the majority in the local council),
the variable ‘Spatially Lagged Alignment’ will take value 1 for a Labour supporter and 0 for the supporters of other
parties. Using a continuous measure (rather than a binary one), reflecting the percentage of contiguous districts
whose political preferences are the same as those of individual n, does not change our results.
41Note that, while 32% of the total number of observations indicate preference to move, only 2.5% of them indicate
a change in the district of residence.
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predictors of the decision to migrate in the immediate future. To this end, we construct an indicator
for actual moving (taking value 1 if the respondent is observed in a different district in the year
of survey wave w than in the year of survey wave w − 1), and regress this indicator on the lagged
value of the four outcome variables (Preference to move, Plan to stay in neighbourhood, Belong to
neighbourhood, and Similar to others in neighbourhood), as well as the lagged value of the treatment
variable Alignment. The estimates, reported in Table 8, indicate that, while people’s satisfaction
with their current location influences their real-life migration decisions, political alignment does
not have a direct and immediate impact on the probability of moving to another district.
[Table 8 about here]
The findings in Table 8, together with the strong evidence of partisan sorting at the district-level
(based on actual movers), suggest that the desire for political homophily affects migration patterns
only through the choice of the destination among migrants; that is, people who decide to migrate
are more likely to move into a district that matches their ideological preferences. To further
corroborate this argument, we run a final round of analysis and examine whether an individual
migrant’s political ideology can predict the partisanship of the destination district. To ensure
that the results are not subject to selection bias,42 we employ a Heckman probit selection model
which allows us to estimate the likelihood of moving to a Conservative or a Labour district while
accounting for the initial likelihood of actually moving. Following the work of McDonald (2011),
the first-stage model (predicting the likelihood of moving to a new district) includes the full set of
controls in Zn,d,w,s together with the alignment variable, whereas the second-stage model (predicting
the likelihood of moving to a Conservative or a Labour district) includes political ideology, age, age
squared, distance of the move, and partisanship of the origin district43 – with the latter controlling
for the fact that each kind of migrant (Conservative or Labour) is also more likely to originate in
these kinds of districts.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 9 report the corresponding second-stage estimates, both for the full
sample of respondents and the subsample of ‘core supporters’;44 whereas columns (5)-(8) check the
robustness of these results to adding GOR × wave × time fixed effects.45 In all specifications,
the estimate of the ideology variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and signed in the
expected direction: being a Conservative or a Labour supporter increases the likelihood of moving
into a Conservative district or a Labour district, respectively. Furthermore, this effect appears to
42Movers are generally not selected randomly from the population, as they tend to be younger, wealthier and better
educated than non-movers (McDonald, 2011).
43The right-hand-side individual-level variables in both stage equations are in lagged terms; i.e., as observed in the
survey wave before the move.
44The first-stage estimates are reported in Table C.9 of the Appendix. Note that our results persist when we
replace the alignment variable in the first stage with the political ideology of the respondent (Conservative or Labour
supporter).
45Due to the small number of movers in our sample, it is not possible to include district or district × wave × time
fixed effects in this setting.
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be far more pronounced when we compare the core supporters of the two parties, who are arguably
more responsive to the political environment of the potential destination districts. To address the
possibility that the observed effects are driven by other individual characteristics which are highly
correlated with political preferences, we also experiment with an alternative specification that
includes additional variables in the second stage; namely, income decile and educational background
indicators.46 As shown in Table C.10 of the Appendix, the results are not affected by the inclusion
of these extra controls: once again, we find strong evidence that an individual migrant’s ideology
helps predict the migrant’s destination.
[Table 9 about here]
4 Conclusions
Internal migration reconfigures a country’s economic, demographic and social landscape, plays a key
role in national well-being and crucially affects the functioning of the labour and housing markets
(e.g., UNDP, 2009; Boustan et al., 2010; Bartram et al., 2014; Bell et al., 2015; Kleemans and
Magruder, 2018). As such, understanding the key drivers of internal migration can shed new light
on its consequences. Destination choices are not random but, rather, driven by specific preferences,
particularly once economic constraints, such as employment, are taken into account. In this paper,
we focus on the political dimension of internal migration and explore the effects of partisanship
on where people choose to live. To do so, we combine district-level with individual-level analyses,
leveraging a nearly exhaustive dataset on the universe of internal migration in England and Wales
across 346 local authority districts between 2002 and 2015, and a rich survey-based dataset over
the same period.
The district-level analysis shows that political proximity between origins and destinations exerts
a positive effect on bilateral migration flows. Although physical distance, wage differentials and
migrant networks are the most important factors in the choice of the destination, as one would
expect, partisan geographic sorting is strongly present. In fact, the estimated effects are not only
statistically significant but also economically meaningful; for instance, a one-standard-deviation
increase in political distance will lead to a decrease in migration flows by about 4%. The individual-
level analysis allows us to gain further important insights into the underlying mechanism: the desire
for political homophily. We demonstrate that political compatibility matters and individuals are
more likely to report positive sentiments towards their neighbourhood, such as a more pronounced
46Based on this specification, gender, employment status, and family-related variables (such as marital status,
having children, and household size) are only included in the first stage. It should be noted, however, that the political
ideology variables remain economically and statistically significant when we don’t account for sample selection and
employ the full set of controls in a probit model predicting the likelihood of moving to a Conservative or Labour
district among movers.
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sense of belonging and ‘fitting in’, when they are politically aligned to their district of residence.
We also demonstrate that political ideology does help predict migrants’ destination choices.
Voting patterns in US presidential elections suggest that the American electorate is geographi-
cally polarized and that this polarization has grown over recent decades. US regions are increasingly
populated by people who think and vote alike, and recent research has shown that this polariza-
tion has partially resulted from selective migration patterns. While the US, as the main focus of
research, is a useful reference point, there is much to learn about how political preferences matter
for internal migration outside this emblematic case. We show that destination choices are strongly
affected by partisanship also in the UK, a country where marked levels of political polarization and
animosity have contributed to sharpening divisions within society.
Our study illustrates that the migration patterns of a significant subset of the British popula-
tion exhibit geographic sorting by political characteristics. This sorting of politically like-minded
individuals can have a number of unfortunate consequences. For one, it is detrimental to the devel-
opment of a diversity of opinions and can discourage political discourse. In turn, this could increase
tensions between population parcels that are distinctive from each other in terms of core values and
beliefs and can result into heightened intolerance in the long-run. Finally, the residential separa-
tion of Conservatives and Labour supporters can contribute to the decline in the number of voters
living in politically competitive settings, which has practical consequences by imposing costs on
non-competitive homogeneous communities, as politicians are less likely to respond to their needs.
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Figure 1: Bilateral Migration Flows
Notes: This graph shows the top dyads in our sample, in terms of size of migration flows, for the years 2002, 2007 and 2012.
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Figure 2: Distribution of ‘Distance in party shares’
Notes: This figure shows the kernel density of the variable Distance in party shares for: (i) the full sample of district
pairs; (ii) the pairs that share the same political preferences; (iii) the pairs that do not share the same political
preferences. The corresponding mean values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1: Migration Flows and Political Similarity: Main Results
Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Geographic distance -1.268*** -1.268*** -1.252*** -1.267*** -1.250***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Contiguity 1.124*** 1.123*** 1.057*** 1.122*** 1.053***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026)
Populationj × Populationi 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.072*** 0.089*** 0.070***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Wagej / Wagei 1.168*** 1.178*** 1.150*** 1.192*** 1.163***
(0.108) (0.107) (0.100) (0.105) (0.098)
Unemploymentj / Unemploymenti -0.286*** -0.248*** -0.282*** -0.178*** -0.201***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036)
Distance in ethnic frac. -0.485*** -0.479*** -0.547*** -0.460*** -0.529***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.134) (0.129) (0.134)
Same party control 0.052*** 0.055***
(0.012) (0.012)




Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.828 0.829 0.830 0.829 0.830
Observations 1,645,412 1,645,412 1,514,238 1,645,412 1,514,238
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses. LDV is the lagged de-
pendent variable. The estimate and standard error of LDV are multiplied by 1,000. ***,**,* Statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Figure 3: Key Determinants of Migration Flows: Relative Importance
(a) Same party control (b) Distance in party shares
Notes: The Random Forest (RF) variable importance measure is calculated based on the specifications in columns (3) and (5) of Table 1.
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Table 2: Migration Flows and Political Similarity: Additional Time-Invariant Similarity Indices
Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Same party control 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.048***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Distance in party shares -0.212*** -0.200*** -0.207*** -0.189***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
Same GOR 0.242*** 0.234*** 0.242*** 0.233***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Same genetic group 0.120*** 0.096*** 0.116*** 0.092***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Same similarity group 0.053* 0.063** 0.046 0.056*





Pseudo-R2 0.831 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.830 0.830 0.832
Observations 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses. LDV is the lagged dependent variable. ***,**,* Statis-
tically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 3: Migration Flows and Political Similarity: Additional Time-Varying Controls
Panel (a) Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Same party control 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.059*** 0.058***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
Night lightsj / Night lightsi -0.002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Distance in share of no qual. -1.634*** -2.355*** -2.353***
(0.190) (0.244) (0.279)
Distance in share of high qual. -0.229 0.870*** 0.835***
(0.149) (0.184) (0.198)
Distance in share of aged 18-64 -0.002 -0.198 -0.168
(0.282) (0.437) (0.455)
Distance in share of over 64 0.192 0.874** 0.869**
(0.235) (0.373) (0.381)
Distance in share of married/couples -0.068 -0.316* -0.213
(0.157) (0.182) (0.193)
Distance in share of manuf. GVA -0.773*** -0.676*** -0.715***
(0.116) (0.117) (0.120)
Distance in share of Muslims -0.559** -0.754*** -0.755***
(0.248) (0.285) (0.277)




Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.833 0.834
Observations 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,065,640 1,065,640
Panel (b) Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Distance in party shares -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.217*** -0.220*** -0.232*** -0.217*** -0.219*** -0.204*** -0.216*** -0.185*** -0.206***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
Night lightsj / Night lightsi -0.000 -0.004 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Distance in share of no qual. -1.635*** -2.264*** -2.317***
(0.189) (0.245) (0.279)
Distance in share of high qual. -0.244* 0.802*** 0.794***
(0.148) (0.184) (0.198)
Distance in share of aged 18-64 0.157 -0.296 -0.255
(0.283) (0.432) (0.449)
Distance in share of over 64 0.432* 1.123*** 1.093***
(0.235) (0.369) (0.376)
Distance in share of married/couples 0.031 -0.203 -0.113
(0.158) (0.181) (0.191)
Distance in share of manuf. GVA -0.781*** -0.701*** -0.733***
(0.116) (0.117) (0.119)
Distance in share of Muslims -0.527** -0.771*** -0.773***
(0.249) (0.284) (0.276)




Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.833 0.834
Observations 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,514,238 1,065,640 1,065,640
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses. LDV is the lagged dependent variable. The estimate and standard error of
Lagged 5-year moving average are multiplied by 1,000. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 4: Migration Flows and Political Similarity: Adding District Pair FEs
Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Populationj × Populationi 0.374*** 0.367*** 0.318*** 0.353*** 0.306***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
Wagej / Wagei 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.097*** 0.128*** 0.098***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021)
Unemploymentj / Unemploymenti -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.062*** -0.055*** -0.064***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Distance in ethnic frac. 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.141*** 0.133*** 0.139***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
Same party control 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002)




Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.915 0.915 0.917 0.915 0.917
Observations 1,454,611 1,454,611 1,324,392 1,454,611 1,324,392
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses. LDV is the lagged de-
pendent variable. The estimate and standard error of LDV are multiplied by 1,000. ***,**,* Statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5: Migration Flows and Political Similarity: 2SLS-IV and Control Function Estimates
2SLS-IV Control Function
Ln(Migration flows + 1) Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance in party shares -0.073*** -0.042*** -0.066** -0.097*** -0.228*** -0.243*** -0.343*** -0.287***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.033) (0.035) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
First-stage residuals 0.093*** 0.106*** 0.314*** 0.259***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021)
Vector Xij,t
LDV
Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
KP stat 225,810 203,057 31,834 34,459
Pseudo-R2 0.830 0.832 0.917 0.918
Observations 1,414,024 1,288,126 1,414,024 1,288,126 1,414,024 1,288,126 1,218,323 1,094,549
Notes: All specifications exclude the initial years 2002 and 2003. Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses.
LDV is the lagged dependent variable. ‘KP stat’ is the Kleibergen–Paap weak instrument statistic. In the Control Function estimation,
the estimated OLS residuals from the first stage are introduced as an additional control variable in the PPML specification. Columns (5)
to (8) report bootstrapped standard errors over 200 replications. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
34
Table 6: Political Alignment and Preference to Move
Preference to move
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alignment -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.030*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Alignment [core supporters] -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015** -0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
District FE
Region × Wave × Time FE
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314
Mean of Alignment 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.471 0.471 0.471 0.471
R2 0.031 0.071 0.141 0.175 0.035 0.074 0.174 0.207
Observations 214,502 214,502 214,502 214,502 143,116 143,116 143,116 143,116
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual and district levels in parentheses (two-way clustering). DV is the dependent variable.
***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 7: Political Alignment and Neighbourhood Satisfaction
Panel (a) Plan to stay in neighbourhood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alignment 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.035*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Alignment [core supporters] 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.018** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
District FE
Region × Wave × Time FE
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.708 0.708 0.708 0.708
Mean of Alignment 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.464 0.464 0.464 0.464
R2 0.031 0.125 0.146 0.228 0.037 0.124 0.182 0.255
Observations 77,520 77,520 77,520 77,520 53,943 53,943 53,943 53,943
Panel (b) Belong to neighbourhood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alignment 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Alignment [core supporters] 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
District FE
Region × Wave × Time FE
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.695 0.695 0.695 0.695 0.694 0.694 0.694 0.694
Mean of Alignment 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.464 0.464 0.464 0.464
R2 0.030 0.079 0.139 0.180 0.033 0.080 0.172 0.209
Observations 77,653 77,653 77,653 77,653 54,088 54,088 54,088 54,088
Panel (c) Similar to others in neighbourhood
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alignment 0.049*** 0.034*** 0.054*** 0.039***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Alignment [core supporters] 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.039*** 0.035***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
District FE
Region × Wave × Time FE
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.626 0.626 0.626 0.626 0.634 0.634 0.634 0.634
Mean of Alignment 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.464 0.464 0.464 0.464
R2 0.030 0.104 0.136 0.201 0.033 0.109 0.169 0.231
Observations 77,515 77,515 77,515 77,515 53,939 53,939 53,939 53,939
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual and district levels in parentheses (two-way clustering). DV is the dependent variable.
***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 8: The Effects on Actual Moving
Move district
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Preference to move 0.038*** 0.030***
(0.002) (0.002)
Plan to stay in neighbourhood -0.056*** -0.048***
(0.003) (0.003)
Belong to neighbourhood -0.020*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002)





Region × Wave × Time FE
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of Move district 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.025
Mean of x-var 0.305 0.305 0.725 0.725 0.698 0.698 0.642 0.642 0.357 0.357
R2 0.068 0.322 0.083 0.314 0.064 0.301 0.063 0.301 0.056 0.316
Observations 125,156 125,156 36,885 36,885 36,886 36,886 36,880 36,880 125,156 125,156
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual and district levels in parentheses (two-way clustering). The dependent variable, Move district, is a binary indicator
taking value 1 if the respondent is observed in a different district in the year of survey wave w than in the year of survey wave w − 1. x-var is the main independent
variable, as shown in each column. All right-hand-side variables (x-var and vector Zn,d,w,s) are in lagged terms (as observed in survey wave w − 1). ***,**,* Statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 9: Political Preferences and the Destination Choice
Move to Con. Move to Lab. Move to Con. Move to Lab.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Con. supporter 0.120*** 0.088***
(0.016) (0.018)
Con. supporter [core supporters] 0.159*** 0.128***
(0.020) (0.023)
Lab. supporter 0.086*** 0.063***
(0.014) (0.016)
Lab. supporter [core supporters] 0.135*** 0.110***
(0.019) (0.021)
Age 0.012*** 0.015*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.012*** 0.022*** -0.012*** -0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Age sq. -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Con. origin 0.080*** 0.086*** 0.010 0.014 -0.011 -0.012 0.038* 0.075***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.030) (0.020) (0.028)
Lab. origin -0.095*** -0.062** 0.175*** 0.163*** -0.026 0.028 0.052** 0.060**
(0.019) (0.026) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.022) (0.031)
Ln(Distance of move) -0.006 0.002 -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.008 0.013 -0.025*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
GOR × Wave × Time FE
Inverse Mill’s ratio (Mill’s λ) 0.019 -0.011 -0.069** -0.025 0.071* -0.039 -0.016 0.076
(0.038) (0.048) (0.035) (0.044) (0.041) (0.050) (0.037) (0.047)
Selected observations 4,084 2,358 4,084 2,358 3,146 1,731 3,146 1,731
Non-selected observations 155,300 104,588 155,300 104,588 122,185 77,544 122,185 77,544
Notes: This table shows the second-stage estimates of a Heckman probit selection model, predicting the likelihood of moving to a Conservative
district (Move to Con.) or a Labour district (Move to Lab.). Standard errors are in parentheses. Con. supporter and Lab. supporter are binary
indicators capturing supporters for the Conservative party and the Labour party respectively. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) restrict the sample
to include the ‘core supporters’ for the two parties. All right-hand-side individual-level variables are in lagged terms (as observed in survey wave
w − 1). ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Micromotives and macromoves:
Political preferences and internal migration in England and Wales
APPENDIX
For Online Publication
A. Local Government Services, Elections and Reforms
The local government structure in the UK has both two-tier and single-tier components. In
England, there are 27 upper-tier county councils with 201 district councils. Additionally,
there are 145 districts (123 in England and 22 in Wales) which operate on a single-tier basis.
Most responsibilities are split between counties and districts in two-tier authorities, whereas
single-tier authorities must provide all public services. In the case of two-tier authorities,
the county councils provide around 80% of the services, including schools, social services,
public transportation, highways, waste disposal and trading standards, whereas the district
councils provide more local services, including council housing, local planning, recycling and
refuse collection and leisure facilities.
Elections are organized by subdivisions of local authorities, called electoral wards or
electoral divisions. England and Wales use the first-past-the-post voting system to elect
the councillor in each electoral ward. Terms last for four years, and most councils hold
elections by “thirds”, with one-third of the seats up for election each year, and with no
election held one year. Due to this rotating fashion by which councilors are elected, local
authority elections can, in practice, take place in any given year. To construct our political
distance measures, we follow Fetzer (2019) and use election results at the district council
and single-tier authority level between 2002 and 2015.
The main change in the structure of local government since 2002 was the introduction
of nine new unitary authorities (UAs) in England in 2009. In the first five county councils,
the lower tier district councils were abolished, and all functions were undertaken by the new
UA of the same name. In Bedfordshire, Mid- and South Bedfordshire merged to form the
Central Bedfordshire UA. Bedford attained UA status, having previously been a district. In
Cheshire, the UA of Cheshire West and Chester was formed from the districts of Ellesmere
Port and Neston, Vale Royal, and Chester. The districts of Macclesfield, Congleton and
Crewe and Nantwich merged to form Cheshire East. In order to compare the regions before
and after this reform, we follow Fetzer (2019) and merge the district-level electoral results
between 2002 and 2008 into the current UA boundaries. There is no concern of overlap, as
no district council was split to form the new UAs.
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B. District-Level Analysis: Additional Tables & Figures
• Table B.1 presents summary statistics, detailed definitions and sources for each variable
used in the district-level analysis.
• Table B.2 provides a list of all districts in England and Wales and the corresponding
government office region (GOR) to which they belong.
• Figure B.1 presents the average value of bilateral migration flows relative to: (i) the
population size of the destination district; (ii) the total size of migration flows to the
destination district.
• Table B.3 reports selection ratios based on the method proposed by Altonji et al. (2005).
According to these ratios, unobservable factors would have to be 4-53 times stronger
than observables to explain away the full relationship between political similarity and
migration flows, as reported in Table 4.
• Table B.4 shows robustness of the results reported in Tables 1 and 4 (before and after
adding pair FEs) to using the 1-year and 2-year lagged values of the political similarity
measures.
• Table B.5 presents the first-stage results of the 2SLS-IV and control function estima-
tions reported in Table 5.
• Table B.6 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 4 to excluding intra-region
migration flows; i.e., the set of district pairs that belong to the same GOR.
• Table B.7 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 4 to using three alterna-
tive types of standard errors: (i) heteroscedasticity-robust; (ii) clustered at the dyad
(district-pair) level; and (iii) clustered at the origin, destination and year levels (three-
way clustering).
• Table B.8 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 4 to including the ra-
tio of destination-to-origin district Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) among the
regressors.
• Table B.9 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 4 to running separate
regressions for district pairs with two-tier authorities and those with at least one single-
tier authority.
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• Table B.10 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 4 to replacing the baseline
‘composite’ measure Distance in party shares with either Distance in Con. party share
or Distance in Lab. party share, calculated by the absolute difference (between the
two districts) in the share of Conservative or Labour party seats in the local council,
respectively.
• Table B.11 examines the impact of the relative Conservative or Labour ratio (the
ratio of destination-to-origin district Conservative or Labour seat shares) on migration
flows conditional on the partisan composition of the two districts. According to the
results, the value of these ratios matters the most when people move across political
mismatched districts.
3
Table B.1: Summary Statistics and Definitions of Model Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations Description
Migration flows 21.882 101.220 0.000 5,850 1,645,412 The number of migrants flowing from the origin district to the destination district in each
year. ONS
Same party control 0.258 0.437 0.000 1.000 1,645,412 =1 if either the Conservative party or the Labour party holds the majority of local council
seats at both the origin and destination; 0 otherwise. BLED
Distance in Con. share 0.297 0.215 0.000 1.000 1,645,412 Absolute difference (between the two districts) in the share of Conservative party seats
in the local council. BLED
Distance in Lab. share 0.286 0.227 0.000 1.000 1,645,412 Absolute difference (between the two districts) in the share of Labour party seats in the
local council. BLED
Distance in party shares 0.291 0.186 0.000 1.000 1,645,412 The average value of Distance in Con. share and Distance in Lab. share. BLED
Geographic distance 5.046 0.707 0.740 6.345 1,645,412 Distance (KMs) between the destination district and the origin district (in logs). Authors’
calculation
Contiguity 0.015 0.122 0.000 1.000 1,645,412 =1 if the destination district and the origin district share a contiguous border; 0 other-
wise. Authors’ calculation
Populationj × Populationi 6.825 1.972 1.597 20.487 1,645,412 Product of the natural log populations (divided by 10,000) of the two districts. ONS
Wagej / Wagei 1.052 0.370 0.155 6.440 1,645,412 Destination average yearly wage divided by the origin average yearly wage. ONS
Unemploymentj / Unemploymenti 1.122 0.564 0.090 11.167 1,645,412 Destination unemployment rate divided by the origin unemployment rate. ONS
Distance in ethnic frac. 0.068 0.066 0.000 0.656 1,645,412 Absolute difference (between the two districts) in the ethnic fractionalization index, mea-
sured for all non-white ethnic groups. The groups are: Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi;
Chinese; Black Caribbean; Black African; other Asian; other Black; and a residual cat-
egory grouping together all other non-white ethnicities. Linearly interpolated for non-
census years. ONS via Nomis
Same region 0.117 0.321 0.000 1.000 1,645,412 =1 if the destination district and the origin district belong to the same government office
region (GOR); 0 otherwise. Authors’ calculation
Same genetic group 0.511 0.500 0.000 1.000 1,645,412 =1 if the destination and the origin district share the same genetic roots; 0 otherwise.
Leslie et al. (2015)
Top 5 most similar origin 0.014 0.120 0.000 1.000 1,645,412 =1 if the origin district is in the destination’s top 5 most similar districts, as determined
by similarity across 59 census statistics; 0 otherwise. ONS
Night lightsj / Night lightsi 1.717 2.536 0.013 77.865 1,645,412 Destination nighttime light intensity divided by the origin nighttime light intensity.
DMSP-OLS
Distance in share of no qual. 0.058 0.043 0.000 0.290 1,645,412 Absolute difference (between the two districts) in the share of the population with no
formal qualifications, linearly interpolated for non-census years. ONS via Nomis
Distance in share of high qual. 0.079 0.067 0.000 0.413 1,645,412 Absolute difference (between the two districts) in the share of the population who have
level 4 or above qualifications, linearly interpolated for non-census years. ONS via Nomis
Distance in share of aged 18-64 0.033 0.031 0.000 0.232 1,645,412 Absolute difference (between the two districts) in the share of the population who are
aged 18 to 64, linearly interpolated for non-census years. ONS via Nomis
Distance in share of over 64 0.042 0.034 0.000 0.256 1,645,412 Absolute difference (between the two districts) in the share of the population who are
aged over 64, linearly interpolated for non-census years. ONS via Nomis
Distance in share of married/couples 0.066 0.059 0.000 0.358 1,645,412 Absolute difference (between the two districts) in the share of the population who are
married or in a relationship, linearly interpolated for non-census years. ONS via Nomis
Distance in share of manuf. GVA 0.082 0.067 0.000 0.461 1,645,412 Absolute difference (between the two districts) in the share of total gross value added
(GVA) generated by the manufacturing sector. ONS
Distance in share of Muslims 0.040 0.058 0.000 0.364 1,645,412 Absolute difference (between the two districts) in the share of the population who are
Muslims, linearly interpolated for non-census years. ONS via Nomis
IMDj / IMDi 0.033 0.158 0.000 9.830 1,435,339 The destination district’s rank in the Index of Multiple Deprivations divided by the origin
district’s rank in the same index, linearly interpolated for non-recorded years. ONS.
Notes: ONS - Office for National Statistics; BLED - British Local Election Database; DMSP-OLS - DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series Dataset (version 4).
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Table B.2: GOR - LAD list
Government office region Local authority district
East Babergh; Basildon; Bedford; Braintree; Breckland; Brentwood; Broadland; Broxbourne;
Cambridge; Castle Point; Central Bedfordshire; Chelmsford; Colchester; Dacorum;
East Cambridgeshire; East Hertfordshire; Epping Forest; Fenland; Forest Heath; Great
Yarmouth; Harlow; Hertsmere; Huntingdonshire; Ipswich; King’s Lynn and West Norfolk;
Luton; Maldon; Mid Suffolk; North Hertfordshire; North Norfolk; Norwich; Peterbor-
ough; Rochford; South Cambridgeshire; South Norfolk; Southend-on-Sea; St Albans; St
Edmundsbury; Stevenage; Suffolk Coastal; Tendring; Three Rivers; Thurrock; Uttlesford;
Watford; Waveney; Welwyn Hatfield
East Midlands Amber Valley; Ashfield; Bassetlaw; Blaby; Bolsover; Boston; Broxtowe; Charnwood;
Chesterfield; Corby; Daventry; Derby; Derbyshire Dales; East Lindsey; East Northamp-
tonshire; Erewash; Gedling; Harborough; High Peak; Hinckley and Bosworth; Ketter-
ing; Leicester; Lincoln; Mansfield; Melton; Newark and Sherwood; North East Der-
byshire; North Kesteven; North West Leicestershire; Northampton; Nottingham; Oadby
and Wigston; Rushcliffe; Rutland; South Derbyshire; South Holland; South Kesteven;
South Northamptonshire; Wellingborough; West Lindsey
London Barking and Dagenham; Barnet; Bexley; Brent; Bromley; Camden; Croydon; Ealing;
Enfield; Greenwich; Hackney; Hammersmith and Fulham; Haringey; Harrow; Havering;
Hillingdon; Hounslow; Islington; Kensington and Chelsea; Kingston upon Thames; Lam-
beth; Lewisham; Merton; Newham; Redbridge; Richmond upon Thames; Southwark;
Sutton; Tower Hamlets; Waltham Forest; Wandsworth; Westminster
North East County Durham; Darlington; Gateshead; Hartlepool; Middlesbrough; Newcastle upon
Tyne; North Tyneside; Northumberland; Redcar and Cleveland; South Tyneside;
Stockton-on-Tees; Sunderland
North West Allerdale; Barrow-in-Furness; Blackburn with Darwen; Blackpool; Bolton; Burnley; Bury;
Carlisle; Cheshire East; Cheshire West and Chester; Chorley; Copeland; Eden; Fylde;
Halton; Hyndburn; Knowsley; Lancaster; Liverpool; Manchester; Oldham; Pendle; Pre-
ston; Ribble Valley; Rochdale; Rossendale; Salford; Sefton; South Lakeland; South Rib-
ble; St. Helens; Stockport; Tameside; Trafford; Warrington; West Lancashire; Wigan;
Wirral; Wyre
South East Adur; Arun; Ashford; Aylesbury Vale; Basingstoke and Deane; Bracknell Forest;
Brighton and Hove; Canterbury; Cherwell; Chichester; Chiltern; Crawley; Dartford;
Dover; East Hampshire; Eastbourne; Eastleigh; Elmbridge; Epsom and Ewell; Fare-
ham; Gosport; Gravesham; Guildford; Hart; Hastings; Havant; Horsham; Isle of Wight;
Lewes; Maidstone; Medway; Mid Sussex; Milton Keynes; Mole Valley; New Forest; Ox-
ford; Portsmouth; Reading; Reigate and Banstead; Rother; Runnymede; Rushmoor;
Sevenoaks; Shepway; Slough; South Bucks; South Oxfordshire; Southampton; Spelthorne;
Surrey Heath; Swale; Tandridge; Test Valley; Thanet; Tonbridge and Malling; Tunbridge
Wells; Vale of White Horse; Waverley; Wealden; West Berkshire; West Oxfordshire;
Winchester; Windsor and Maidenhead; Woking; Wokingham; Worthing; Wycombe
South West Bath and North East Somerset; Bournemouth; Bristol, City of; Cheltenham;
Christchurch; Cornwall; Cotswold; East Devon; East Dorset; Exeter; Forest of Dean;
Gloucester; Mendip; Mid Devon; North Devon; North Dorset; North Somerset; Ply-
mouth; Poole; Purbeck; Sedgemoor; South Gloucestershire; South Hams; South Som-
erset; Stroud; Swindon; Taunton Deane; Teignbridge; Tewkesbury; Torbay; Torridge;
West Devon; West Dorset; West Somerset; Weymouth and Portland; Wiltshire
Wales Blaenau Gwent; Bridgend; Caerphilly; Cardiff; Carmarthenshire; Ceredigion; Conwy;
Denbighshire; Flintshire; Gwynedd; Isle of Anglesey; Merthyr Tydfil; Monmouthshire;
Neath Port Talbot; Newport; Pembrokeshire; Powys; Rhondda Cynon Taf; Swansea;
Torfaen; Vale of Glamorgan; Wrexham
West Midlands Birmingham; Bromsgrove; Cannock Chase; Coventry; Dudley; East Staffordshire; Here-
fordshire, County of; Lichfield; Malvern Hills; Newcastle-under-Lyme; North War-
wickshire; Nuneaton and Bedworth; Redditch; Rugby; Sandwell; Shropshire; Solihull;
South Staffordshire; Stafford; Staffordshire Moorlands; Stoke-on-Trent; Stratford-on-
Avon; Tamworth; Telford and Wrekin; Walsall; Warwick; Wolverhampton; Worcester;
Wychavon; Wyre Forest
Yorkshire and The Humber Barnsley; Bradford; Calderdale; Craven; Doncaster; East Riding of Yorkshire; Hamble-
ton; Harrogate; Kingston upon Hull, City of; Kirklees; Leeds; North East Lincolnshire;
North Lincolnshire; Richmondshire; Rotherham; Ryedale; Scarborough; Selby; Sheffield;
Wakefield; York
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Figure B.1: Bilateral Migration Inflows Relative to Destination
Population Size and Total Inflows
Notes: This figure shows the average value of migration flows from district i to district j relative to the
population size of district j and the total size of migration flows to district j (before and after excluding
observations that correspond to zero flows).
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Table B.3: Selection-On-Unobservables
Uncontrolled regression Controlled regression Selection ratio (SR)
Dest. × Orig. FEs Dest. × Orig. FEs Same party control SR : 26.65
Dest. × Year FEs Dest. × Year FEs Distance in party shares SR : 22.43
Orig. × Year FEs Orig. × Year FEs
Vector Xij,t
Dest. × Orig. FEs Dest. × Orig. FEs Same party control SR : 4.85
Dest. × Year FEs Dest. × Year FEs Distance in party shares SR : 4.63
Orig. × Year FEs Orig. × Year FEs
LDV
Vector Xij,t
Dest. × Orig. FEs Dest. × Orig. FEs Same party control SR : 53.30
Dest. × Year FEs Dest. × Year FEs Distance in party shares SR : 23.02
Orig. × Year FEs Orig. × Year FEs
LDV LDV
Vector Xij,t
Notes: LDV is the lagged dependent variable. SR is the Altonji et al. (2005)’s selection ratio, which indicates
the degree of selection on unobservables relative to observables (the additional controls in the ‘controlled’ regres-
sion) that would be needed to fully explain our results by omitted variable bias.
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Table B.4: Migration Flows and Political Similarity: Lagged Effects
Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Same party control t−1 0.047*** 0.008***
(0.013) (0.002)
Same party control t−2 0.038*** 0.009***
(0.013) (0.002)
Distance in party shares t−1 -0.208*** -0.052***
(0.038) (0.008)




Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.917 0.917 0.917 0.917
Observations 1,513,570 1,400,153 1,513,570 1,400,153 1,323,737 1,207,890 1,323,737 1,207,890
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses. LDV is the lagged dependent variable. t − 1 and t − 2 indicate the
first-year and second-year lagged values of the variables respectively. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table B.5: Migration Flows and Political Similarity: 2SLS-IV and Control Function First-Stage Estimates
Distance in party shares
2SLS-IV Control Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Shift-share instrument 0.822*** 0.814*** 1.424*** 1.475*** 0.822*** 0.814*** 1.418*** 1.465***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009)
Geographic distance 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Contiguity 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Populationj × Populationi -0.009*** -0.010*** 0.035*** 0.029*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 0.004 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.012)
Wagej / Wagei 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.033*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.031*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Unemploymentj / Unemploymenti 0.173*** 0.195*** 0.002 0.015*** 0.173*** 0.195*** -0.001 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Distance in ethnic frac. -0.016*** -0.014** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.016*** -0.014** -0.045*** -0.047***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
LDV
Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Observations 1,414,024 1,288,126 1,414,024 1,288,126 1,414,024 1,288,126 1,218,323 1,094,549
Notes: See notes for Table 5 (second-stage estimation). LDV is the lagged value of Migration flows. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively.
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Table B.6: Migration Flows and Political Similarity: Exclude Intra-GOR Flows
East West East of Yorkshire and
GOR excluded: Midlands Midlands England Wales South West South East The Humber North West North East London
Panel (a) Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Same party control 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Vector Xij,t
LDV
Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.914 0.912 0.914 0.915 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.912 0.915 0.899
Observations 1,304,527 1,313,147 1,296,637 1,318,524 1,308,484 1,267,466 1,318,932 1,305,388 1,322,678 1,311,496
Panel (b) Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distance in party shares -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.078***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Vector Xij,t
LDV
Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.914 0.912 0.914 0.915 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.912 0.915 0.899
Observations 1,304,527 1,313,147 1,296,637 1,318,524 1,308,484 1,267,466 1,318,932 1,305,388 1,322,678 1,311,496
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses. LDV is the lagged dependent variable. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table B.7: Migration Flows and Political Similarity:
Alternative Types of Standard Error
Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)










Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.915 0.915 0.917 0.917
Observations 1,454,611 1,454,611 1,324,392 1,324,392
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at
the dyad (district-pair) level in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the origin, destination
and year levels (three-way clustering) in curly brackets. LDV is the lagged dependent variable.
***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table B.8: Migration Flows and Political Similarity:
Controlling for the Relative Index of Multiple Deprivations
Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IMDj / IMDi -0.009 0.025 -0.009 0.025
(0.009) (0.024) (0.009) (0.024)
Same party control 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)




Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.919 0.920 0.919 0.920
Observations 1,280,908 1,168,077 1,280,908 1,168,077
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses. LDV is
the lagged dependent variable. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively.
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Table B.9: Migration Flows and Political Similarity: Accounting for the Level of Local Government
Migration flows
Intra-Two-Tier All Else Intra-Two-Tier All Else
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Same party control 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Distance in party shares -0.103*** -0.100*** -0.042*** -0.038***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)
Vector Xij,t
LDV
Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.912 0.913 0.917 0.919 0.912 0.913 0.917 0.919
Observations 653,067 591,864 801,544 732,528 653,067 591,864 801,544 732,528
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses. LDV is the lagged dependent variable. Columns (1)-(2) and
(5)-(6) show the results for district pairs with two-tier authorities. Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) show the results for district pairs with at least
one single-tier authority. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table B.10: Migration Flows and Political Similarity:
Disaggregated Political Distance
Migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance in Con. party share -0.030*** -0.029***
(0.006) (0.006)




Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.915 0.917 0.915 0.917
Observations 1,454,611 1,324,392 1,454,611 1,324,392
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses. LDV is the
lagged dependent variable. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level re-
spectively.
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Table B.11: Migration Flows and Political Similarity:
Moving Across Politically Mismatched Districts
Migration flows





Conservative ratio × ConiLabj 0.040*** 0.029**
(0.015) (0.013)
Conservative ratio × (1−ConiLabj) -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Labour ratio × LabiConj 0.016 0.015
(0.012) (0.011)
Labour ratio × (1−LabiConj) -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Diff-test 0.003 0.011 0.081 0.087
Vector Xij,t
LDV
Dest. × Orig. FE
Dest. × Year FE
Orig. × Year FE
Pseudo-R2 0.915 0.917 0.915 0.917
Observations 1,454,611 1,324,392 1,454,611 1,324,392
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the dyad (district-pair) level in parentheses. LDV is the lagged
dependent variable. Conservative (Labour) ratio is the ratio of destination-to-origin district Conser-
vative (Labour) seat shares. ConiLabj indicates pairs of Conservative-origin and Labour-destination
districts. LabiConj indicates pairs of Labour-origin and Conservative-destination districts. Diff-test in
columns (1)-(2) reports the p-value of a one-sided test, where H0: the difference between the estimates
of Conservative ratio × ConiLabj and Conservative ratio × (1−ConiLabj) is equal to zero, and H1:
the difference between the two estimates is positive. Diff-test in columns (3)-(4) reports the p-value of a
one-sided test, where H0: the difference between the estimates of Labour ratio × LabiConj and Labour
ratio × (1−LabiConj) is equal to zero, and H1: the difference between the two estimates is positive.
***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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C. Individual-Level Analysis: Additional Tables
• Table C.1 presents summary statistics and detailed definitions for each variable used
in the individual-level analysis.
• Table C.2 reports the full regression results of Table 6.
• Table C.3 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 6 to dropping respondents
who live in the same GOR (one GOR at a time).
• Table C.4 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 6 to using alternative
clustering of standard errors: at the district and survey wave levels, or at the district
level alone.
• Table C.5 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 6 to replacing the alignment
variable with its lagged value.
• Table C.6 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 6 to augmenting the regres-
sion model with a placebo variable capturing non-treatment years: a binary indicator
taking value 1 either in the year before or in the year after an individual takes an
alignment status.
• Table C.7 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 6 to augmenting the re-
gression model with the spatially lagged alignment: a binary indicator taking value 1
if an individual’s political preferences are aligned with the political preferences of the
majority of the contiguous districts.
• Table C.8 investigates the heterogeneity of the effects reported in Table 6 by splitting
respondents into two groups based on one of the following characteristics: political
ideology, age, income and education. In all cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that the effect of alignment is statistically different between the two sub-groups.
• Table C.9 presents the first-stage results of the Heckman probit selection model esti-
mations reported in Table 9.
• Table C.10 shows robustness of the results reported in Table 9 to including additional
controls in the second stage; namely, income decile and educational background indi-
cators.
16
Table C.1: Summary Statistics and Definitions of Model Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations Description
Preference to move 0.315 0.465 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent answers “Prefer to move” to the following: “If you could choose, would you
stay here in your present home or would you prefer to move somewhere else?”; 0 otherwise.
Plan to stay in neighbourhood 0.707 0.455 0 1 77,516 =1 if respondent answers “Strongly agree” or “Agree” to the following:“I plan to remain a
resident of this neighbourhood for a number of years”; 0 otherwise.
Belong to neighbourhood 0.695 0.460 0 1 77,649 =1 if respondent answers “Strongly agree” or “Agree” to the following: “I feel like I belong
to this neighbourhood”; 0 otherwise.
Similar to others in neighbourhood 0.626 0.484 0 1 77,511 =1 if respondent answers “Strongly agree” or “Agree” to the following: “I think of myself as
similar to the people who live in this neighbourhood”; 0 otherwise.
Alignment 0.357 0.479 0 1 214,502 =1 if individual prefers a particular party and that party holds the majority of seats in the
local district council; 0 otherwise.
Alignment [core supporters] 0.275 0.447 0 1 214,502 =1 if individual prefers a particular party (Conservatives or Labour), has not changed their
preference over time and that party holds the majority of seats in the local district council;
0 otherwise.
Move to Con. 0.430 0.495 0 1 4,084 =1 if respondent has moved to a Conservative majority district; 0 otherwise
Move to Lab. 0.295 0.456 0 1 4,084 =1 if respondent has moved to a Labour majority district; 0 otherwise
Con. supporter 0.333 0.471 0 1 4,084 =1 if the respondent supports the Conservative party; 0 otherwise
Lab. supporter 0.399 0.490 0 1 4,084 =1 if the respondent supports the Labour party; 0 otherwise
Con. origin 0.382 0.486 0 1 4,084 =1 if respondent has moved from a Conservative majority district; 0 otherwise
Lab. origin 0.316 0.465 0 1 4,084 =1 if respondent has moved from a Labour majority district; 0 otherwise
Ln(Distance of move) 3.666 1.160 1 6 4,084 Distance (KMs) between the destination district and the origin district (in logs)
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Female 0.536 0.499 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent is female; 0 if male.
Age 50.603 17.995 16 104 214,502 Age of the respondent.
Age squared 2,884.479 1,879.997 256 10,816 214,502 Age of the respondent squared.
Income decile 5.741 2.854 1 10 214,502 Monthly income decile, where 10 represents individuals with the highest monthly income in
the month prior to their interview and 1 the lowest.
Self employed 0.079 0.270 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent is self-employed; 0 otherwise.
Employed 0.470 0.499 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent is employed; 0 otherwise.
Unemployed 0.036 0.186 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent is unemployed; 0 otherwise.
Retired 0.277 0.448 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent is retired; 0 otherwise.
Maternity leave 0.005 0.071 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent is on maternity leave; 0 otherwise.
Family care 0.052 0.222 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent is a family carer; 0 otherwise.
Student 0.042 0.200 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent is a student; 0 otherwise.
Sick/Disabled 0.032 0.177 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent is sick/disabled; 0 otherwise.
Govt. training scheme 0.001 0.024 0 1 214,502 =1 if respondent is on a government training scheme; 0 otherwise.
Other job status 0.005 0.074 0 1 214,502 =1 if job status is not described above; 0 otherwise.
Degree 0.238 0.426 0 1 214,502 =1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is a first degree; 0 otherwise.
Other degree 0.112 0.315 0 1 214,502 =1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is above a first degree; 0 otherwise.
A-level 0.201 0.400 0 1 214,502 =1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is A-levels; 0 otherwise.
GCSE 0.199 0.399 0 1 214,502 =1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is GCSE’s; 0 otherwise.
Other qualification 0.101 0.302 0 1 214,502 =1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is not listed above; 0 otherwise.
No qualifications 0.150 0.357 0 1 214,502 =1 if the respondent has no formal education; 0 otherwise.
Married 0.676 0.468 0 1 214,502 =1 if the respondent is married or living together; 0 otherwise.
Never married 0.168 0.374 0 1 214,502 =1 if the respondent is single or never married; 0 otherwise.
Divorced, widowed or separated 0.156 0.363 0 1 214,502 =1 if the respondent is divorced, widowed or separated; 0 otherwise
Household size 2.760 1.426 1 16 214,502 The number of individuals living in the respondent’s household.
Has children 0.263 0.440 0 1 214,502 =1 if the respondent has children living at home; 0 otherwise.
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Table C.2: Political Alignment and Preference to Move: Full Regression Results
Preference to move
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Second income decile 0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Third income decile 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Fourth income decile -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Fifth income decile -0.016** -0.014* -0.021** -0.017*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Sixth income decile -0.017** -0.016** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Seventh income decile -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.035***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Eighth income decile -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.046*** -0.045***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Ninth income decile -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.053*** -0.048***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Tenth (top) income decile -0.092*** -0.088*** -0.096*** -0.090***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Self employed 0.006 0.002 0.030 0.023
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
Employed 0.021 0.016 0.038** 0.030
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Unemployed 0.048*** 0.041** 0.060*** 0.053**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Retired -0.014 -0.018 -0.004 -0.011
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
Maternity leave 0.043* 0.039* 0.063** 0.048*
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027)
Family care -0.011 -0.013 0.003 -0.004
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Student -0.088*** -0.092*** -0.075*** -0.077***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Sick/Disabled 0.024 0.013 0.041* 0.027
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022)
Govt. training scheme 0.048 0.036 0.045 0.032
(0.048) (0.052) (0.047) (0.052)
Other job status 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Degree 0.008 0.011 0.014* 0.016*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Other degree 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
A-level 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
GCSE 0.012* 0.014** 0.019** 0.018**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Other qualification 0.017** 0.016** 0.020** 0.016*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
No qualifications 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Divorced, widowed or separated 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Household size -0.002 -0.004 -0.007** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Has children 0.003 0.004 0.023*** 0.027***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Alignment -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.030*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Alignment [core supporters] -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015** -0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
District FE
GOR × Wave × Time FE
District × Wave × Time FE
Mean of DV 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314
Mean of Alignment 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.471 0.471 0.471 0.471
R2 0.031 0.071 0.141 0.175 0.035 0.074 0.174 0.207
Observations 214,502 214,502 214,502 214,502 143,116 143,116 143,116 143,116
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual and district levels in parentheses (two-way clustering). DV is the de-
pendent variable. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table C.3: Political Alignment and Preference to Move: Exclude GORs
GOR excluded: North North Yorkshire East West East of South South
East West & Humber Midlands Midlands England London East West Wales
Panel (a) Preference to move
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Alignment -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.027***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.316 0.316 0.314 0.316 0.313 0.317 0.306 0.314 0.318 0.323
Mean of Alignment 0.352 0.351 0.359 0.353 0.356 0.360 0.339 0.355 0.367 0.377
R2 0.175 0.176 0.180 0.173 0.176 0.171 0.175 0.170 0.175 0.180
Observations 206,506 189,130 194,860 197,117 195,935 194,017 188,224 184,329 194,660 185,740
Panel (b) Preference to move
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Alignment [core supporters] -0.015** -0.018** -0.017** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.016** -0.017** -0.019***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.314 0.315 0.312 0.315 0.311 0.315 0.303 0.313 0.316 0.321
Mean of Alignment 0.471 0.473 0.481 0.473 0.478 0.478 0.457 0.470 0.485 0.497
R2 0.207 0.209 0.213 0.204 0.208 0.201 0.208 0.200 0.205 0.211
Observations 136,939 124,909 129,678 131,035 129,538 130,324 122,877 124,662 131,411 126,671
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual and district levels in parentheses (two-way clustering). DV is the dependent variable. ***,**,* Statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table C.4: Political Alignment and Preference to Move: Alternative Error Clustering
Preference to move
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alignment -0.026 -0.022 -0.030 -0.025
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
[0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.004]***
{0.004}*** {0.004}*** {0.005}*** {0.004}***
Alignment [core supporters] -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)** (0.007)***
[0.006]** [0.005]*** [0.008]* [0.007]**
{0.005}*** {0.005}*** {0.007}** {0.007}***
District FE
GOR × Wave × Time FE
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314
Mean of Alignment 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.471 0.471 0.471 0.471
R2 0.031 0.071 0.141 0.175 0.035 0.074 0.174 0.207
Observations 214,502 214,502 214,502 214,502 143,116 143,116 143,116 143,116
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual and district levels in parentheses (two-way clustering). Standard errors clustered at the district and survey wave
levels in brackets (two-way clustering). Standard errors clustered at the district level alone in curly brackets (one-way clustering). DV is the dependent variable.
***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table C.5: Political Alignment and Preference to Move: Lagged Effects
Preference to move
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged alignment -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Lagged alignment [core supporters] -0.011* -0.012** -0.013* -0.016**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
District FE
GOR × Wave × Time FE
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.302
Mean of Lagged Alignment 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.463
R2 0.032 0.071 0.152 0.186 0.036 0.075 0.187 0.219
Observations 160,058 160,058 160,058 160,058 107,419 107,419 107,419 107,419
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual and district levels in parentheses (two-way clustering). DV is the dependent variable. Lagged align-
ment is the lagged value of Alignment (as observed in survey wave w − 1). ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table C.6: Political Alignment and Preference to Move: Placebo Tests
Preference to move
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alignment -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Placebo -0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Alignment [core supporters] -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Placebo [core supporters] -0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.009)
District FE
GOR × Wave × Time FE
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314
Mean of Alignment 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.471 0.471 0.471 0.471
R2 0.071 0.071 0.175 0.175 0.074 0.074 0.207 0.207
Observations 214,502 214,502 214,502 214,502 143,116 143,116 143,116 143,116
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual and district levels in parentheses (two-way clustering). DV is the dependent variable. Placebo is a
binary variable, taking value 1 either in the year before or in the year after an individual takes an alignment status. ***,**,* Statistically significant at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table C.7: Political Alignment and Preference to Move: Adding a Spatially Lagged Term
Preference to move
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alignment -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.025*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Alignment [core supporters] -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Spatially lagged alignment -0.013*** -0.012** 0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
District FE
GOR × Wave × Time FE
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314
Mean of Alignment 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.471 0.471 0.471 0.471
R2 0.071 0.071 0.175 0.175 0.074 0.074 0.207 0.207
Observations 214,502 214,502 214,502 214,502 143,116 143,116 143,116 143,116
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual and district levels in parentheses (two-way clustering). DV is the dependent variable. Spatially
lagged alignment is a binary indicator taking value 1 if an individual’s political preferences are aligned with the political preferences of the majority of
the contiguous districts. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table C.8: Political Alignment and Preference to Move:
Heterogeneity Across Individuals with Different Characteristics
Preference to move

















Diff-test 0.688 0.572 0.160 0.603
District × Wave × Time FE
Vector Zn,d,w,s
Mean of DV 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314
R2 0.207 0.203 0.206 0.206
Observations 143,116 143,116 143,116 143,116
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual and district levels in parentheses (two-
way clustering). All columns show the results for the subsample of ‘core supporters’. DV
is the dependent variable. Con. Alignment and Lab. Alignment are the interaction terms
of Alignment with binary variables capturing Conservative and Labour supporters. Young
Alignment and Old Alignment are the interaction terms of Alignment with binary variables
capturing young-age and old-age people (as defined by the median value of the age variable).
Poor Alignment and Rich Alignment are the interaction terms of Alignment with binary
variables capturing low-income and high-income people (as defined by the median value of
the income variable). No degree Alignment and Degree Alignment are the interaction terms
of Alignment with binary variables capturing people with a degree (or higher qualification)
and those without a degree. The non-interacted variables for Conservative supporters, young
people, low-income people, and people without a degree, are included in the corresponding
specifications. Diff-test reports the p-value of a two-sided test, where H0: the difference
between the two estimates (shown in each column) is equal to zero. ***,**,* Statistically
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table C.9: Political Preferences and the Destination Choice: First-Stage Estimates
Move district
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age -0.045*** -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.037*** -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.045***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Age sq. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.018 -0.016 -0.018 -0.016 -0.029* -0.014 -0.029* -0.014
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.023)
Second income decile -0.084** -0.122*** -0.084** -0.122*** -0.064 -0.116** -0.064 -0.116**
(0.035) (0.047) (0.035) (0.047) (0.043) (0.059) (0.043) (0.059)
Third income decile -0.088** -0.048 -0.088** -0.048 -0.041 -0.039 -0.041 -0.039
(0.036) (0.046) (0.036) (0.046) (0.043) (0.058) (0.043) (0.058)
Fourth income decile -0.114*** -0.127*** -0.114*** -0.127*** -0.057 -0.097 -0.057 -0.097
(0.037) (0.048) (0.037) (0.048) (0.044) (0.060) (0.044) (0.060)
Fifth income decile -0.189*** -0.157*** -0.189*** -0.157*** -0.126*** -0.100* -0.126*** -0.100*
(0.038) (0.049) (0.038) (0.049) (0.045) (0.061) (0.045) (0.061)
Sixth income decile -0.087** -0.103** -0.087** -0.103** -0.045 -0.080 -0.045 -0.080
(0.037) (0.048) (0.037) (0.048) (0.044) (0.060) (0.044) (0.060)
Seventh income decile -0.087** -0.050 -0.087** -0.050 -0.054 -0.043 -0.054 -0.043
(0.037) (0.047) (0.037) (0.047) (0.044) (0.060) (0.044) (0.060)
Eighth income decile -0.099*** -0.061 -0.099*** -0.061 -0.084* -0.043 -0.084* -0.043
(0.037) (0.048) (0.037) (0.048) (0.045) (0.060) (0.045) (0.060)
Ninth income decile -0.074** -0.009 -0.074** -0.009 -0.039 -0.004 -0.039 -0.004
(0.037) (0.048) (0.037) (0.048) (0.045) (0.060) (0.045) (0.060)
Tenth income decile -0.004 0.123*** -0.004 0.123*** 0.010 0.113* 0.010 0.113*
(0.037) (0.047) (0.037) (0.047) (0.046) (0.060) (0.046) (0.060)
Self-employed -0.158* -0.099 -0.158* -0.099 -0.180* -0.211 -0.180* -0.211
(0.082) (0.114) (0.082) (0.114) (0.100) (0.141) (0.100) (0.141)
Employed -0.217*** -0.155 -0.217*** -0.155 -0.226** -0.199 -0.226** -0.199
(0.079) (0.110) (0.079) (0.110) (0.096) (0.136) (0.096) (0.136)
Unemployed -0.222*** -0.091 -0.222*** -0.091 -0.185* -0.098 -0.185* -0.098
(0.085) (0.116) (0.085) (0.116) (0.103) (0.144) (0.103) (0.144)
Retired -0.168** -0.025 -0.168** -0.025 -0.160 -0.095 -0.160 -0.095
(0.084) (0.116) (0.084) (0.116) (0.101) (0.143) (0.101) (0.143)
Maternity leave -0.138 -0.151 -0.138 -0.151 -0.187 -0.118 -0.187 -0.118
(0.112) (0.151) (0.112) (0.151) (0.136) (0.183) (0.136) (0.183)
Family care -0.105 -0.031 -0.105 -0.031 -0.115 -0.076 -0.115 -0.076
(0.085) (0.116) (0.085) (0.116) (0.103) (0.144) (0.103) (0.144)
Student -0.087 -0.059 -0.087 -0.059 -0.017 0.006 -0.017 0.006
(0.082) (0.113) (0.082) (0.113) (0.101) (0.141) (0.101) (0.141)
Sick/Disabled -0.365*** -0.266** -0.365*** -0.266** -0.377*** -0.338** -0.377*** -0.338**
(0.093) (0.128) (0.093) (0.128) (0.113) (0.159) (0.113) (0.159)
Govt. training scheme -0.257 -0.354 -0.257 -0.354 -0.089 -0.532 -0.089 -0.532
(0.258) (0.341) (0.258) (0.341) (0.308) (0.482) (0.308) (0.482)
Degree 0.395*** 0.433*** 0.395*** 0.433*** 0.358*** 0.402*** 0.358*** 0.402***
(0.033) (0.042) (0.033) (0.042) (0.039) (0.053) (0.039) (0.053)
Other degree 0.180*** 0.249*** 0.180*** 0.249*** 0.171*** 0.217*** 0.171*** 0.217***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.037) (0.046) (0.043) (0.058) (0.043) (0.058)
A-level 0.195*** 0.226*** 0.195*** 0.226*** 0.150*** 0.207*** 0.150*** 0.207***
(0.033) (0.042) (0.033) (0.042) (0.040) (0.053) (0.040) (0.053)
GCSE 0.079** 0.104** 0.079** 0.104** 0.063 0.095* 0.063 0.095*
(0.034) (0.042) (0.034) (0.042) (0.040) (0.053) (0.040) (0.053)
Other qualification 0.096** 0.141*** 0.096** 0.141*** 0.060 0.118* 0.060 0.118*
(0.039) (0.049) (0.039) (0.049) (0.046) (0.060) (0.046) (0.060)
Married -0.004 -0.026 -0.004 -0.026 0.023 0.017 0.023 0.017
(0.022) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.035) (0.026) (0.035)
Divorced, widowed or separated 0.066** 0.068* 0.066** 0.068* 0.111*** 0.126*** 0.111*** 0.126***
(0.030) (0.039) (0.030) (0.039) (0.035) (0.047) (0.035) (0.047)
Household size -0.107*** -0.114*** -0.107*** -0.114*** -0.123*** -0.145*** -0.123*** -0.145***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
Has children -0.148*** -0.083*** -0.148*** -0.083*** -0.153*** -0.082** -0.153*** -0.082**
(0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.026) (0.034)
Alignment -0.015 -0.015 -0.023 -0.023
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018)
Alignment [core supporters] -0.005 -0.005 -0.021 -0.021
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023)
GOR × Wave × Time FE
Selected observations 4,084 2,358 4,084 2,358 3,146 1,731 3,146 1,731
Non-selected observations 155,300 104,588 155,300 104,588 122,185 77,544 122,185 77,544
Notes: This table shows the first-stage estimates of a Heckman probit selection model, predicting the likelihood of moving
to a new district. See also notes for Table 9 (second-stage estimates). Standard errors are in parentheses. All right-hand-
side individual-level variables are in lagged terms (as observed in survey wave w − 1). ***,**,* Statistically significant at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table C.10: Political Preferences and the Destination Choice: Controlling for Income and Education
Move to Con. Move to Lab. Move to Con. Move to Lab.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Con. supporter 0.114*** 0.084***
(0.016) (0.018)
Con. supporter [core] 0.155*** 0.130***
(0.021) (0.023)
Lab. supporter 0.082*** 0.058***
(0.014) (0.016)
Lab. supporter [core] 0.127*** 0.102***
(0.019) (0.022)
Age 0.011*** 0.014*** -0.011*** -0.010** 0.012*** 0.025*** -0.012*** -0.018***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Age sq. -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Con. origin 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.010 0.017 -0.011 -0.011 0.039* 0.077***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.030) (0.020) (0.028)
Lab. origin -0.092*** -0.063** 0.172*** 0.164*** -0.027 0.021 0.051** 0.069**
(0.019) (0.026) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.022) (0.030)
Ln(Distance of move) -0.005 0.002 -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.008 0.013 -0.026*** -0.030***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Second income decile -0.086** -0.093* 0.081** 0.123** -0.090** -0.060 0.043 0.092
(0.038) (0.053) (0.035) (0.049) (0.042) (0.060) (0.038) (0.056)
Third income decile -0.090** -0.036 0.069* 0.020 -0.068 -0.005 0.008 -0.033
(0.038) (0.050) (0.035) (0.046) (0.042) (0.055) (0.038) (0.052)
Fourth income decile -0.026 -0.087 0.073** 0.093* -0.053 -0.086 -0.025 -0.025
(0.039) (0.053) (0.036) (0.049) (0.042) (0.059) (0.038) (0.055)
Fifth income decile -0.033 -0.043 0.028 -0.038 -0.003 -0.044 -0.053 -0.105*
(0.041) (0.054) (0.038) (0.050) (0.044) (0.058) (0.040) (0.054)
Sixth income decile -0.020 -0.024 0.016 0.024 -0.043 -0.057 -0.023 0.026
(0.037) (0.051) (0.034) (0.047) (0.041) (0.056) (0.037) (0.053)
Seventh income decile 0.040 -0.033 0.020 0.010 0.024 -0.042 -0.042 -0.020
(0.037) (0.048) (0.034) (0.045) (0.041) (0.054) (0.037) (0.051)
Eighth income decile -0.056 -0.103** 0.062* 0.090** -0.067 -0.119** 0.009 0.083
(0.037) (0.049) (0.034) (0.045) (0.041) (0.055) (0.038) (0.051)
Ninth income decile 0.032 -0.043 0.001 -0.007 0.011 -0.041 -0.074** -0.054
(0.036) (0.047) (0.033) (0.043) (0.040) (0.053) (0.037) (0.050)
Tenth income decile -0.003 -0.047 0.015 0.005 -0.038 -0.093* -0.037 -0.015
(0.035) (0.044) (0.032) (0.040) (0.039) (0.050) (0.035) (0.047)
Degree 0.018 0.084 -0.002 -0.045 0.024 0.030 -0.015 -0.036
(0.047) (0.061) (0.043) (0.056) (0.050) (0.064) (0.045) (0.060)
Other degree 0.033 0.097 -0.023 -0.063 0.078 0.086 -0.052 -0.084
(0.047) (0.060) (0.043) (0.055) (0.051) (0.065) (0.046) (0.061)
A-level 0.041 0.108* -0.027 -0.052 0.044 0.084 -0.020 -0.043
(0.043) (0.056) (0.040) (0.051) (0.047) (0.061) (0.042) (0.057)
GCSE 0.044 0.122** -0.055 -0.099** 0.036 0.073 -0.072* -0.081
(0.043) (0.054) (0.039) (0.050) (0.046) (0.059) (0.042) (0.055)
Other qualification 0.033 0.058 -0.023 -0.021 0.052 0.076 -0.012 0.026
(0.049) (0.062) (0.045) (0.058) (0.052) (0.066) (0.047) (0.062)
GOR × Wave × Time FE
Inverse Mill’s ratio (Mill’s λ) 0.012 0.007 -0.043 -0.022 0.062 -0.063 0.031 0.097
(0.054) (0.070) (0.050) (0.065) (0.054) (0.067) (0.049) (0.063)
Selected observations 4,084 2,358 4,084 2,358 3,146 1,731 3,146 1,731
Non-selected observations 155,300 104,588 155,300 104,588 122,185 77,544 122,185 77,544
Notes: This table shows the second-stage estimates of a Heckman probit selection model, predicting the likelihood of moving to a
Conservative district (Move to Con.) or a Labour district (Move to Lab.). Con. supporter and Lab. supporter are binary indicators
capturing supporters for the Conservative party and the Labour party respectively. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) restrict the sample
to include the ‘core supporters’ for the two parties. All right-hand-side individual-level variables are in lagged terms (as observed in
survey wave w − 1). ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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